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DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING 
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
For years, administrative law theorists have advocated alternatives to 
the use of judicial mechanisms in administrative decision-making. 1 The 
search for alternatives has greatly increased the use of rulemaking proce-
dures. At the same time, rulemaking itself has evolved into a flexible 
procedural tool which can be tailored to the needs of specific administrative 
problems. 
Too often this evolutionary development has involved exploring 
methods for engrafting selected judicial mechanisms onto the essentially 
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University; B.A. 1966, University of Maryland; 
J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1975, University of Chicago. 
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE: 
ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON CIVIL RULES, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT CONCERNING AMEND-
MENTS OF DISCOVERY RULES, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970) [hereinafter cited as RULES ADVISORY 
COMM.]; 
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: 
Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 113 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn]; 
Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 
1132 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton]; 
Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89 [hereinafter cited as 
Tomlinson] 
Comment, Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as Stanford Comment]; 
Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New York 
Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. 
1. E.g., ASH COMMISSION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, REPORT ON SELECTED INDE-
PENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 5 (1971); Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which 
Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); Sh~piro, The Choice of Rulemaking or 
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 972 (1965). 
See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7.07 (1958) (suggesting that due process does 
not require a formal hearing where no adjudicative facts are in dispute); Fuchs, Procedure in 
Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 278 (1938) (contending that the adversary 
procedure is ill-suited to the formulation of general regulations). 
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legislative process of rulemaking. Almost without exception, these efforts at 
innovation urge the use of the testimonial devices of trial. Yet, rulemaking, 
like a legislative hearing, is essentially investigatorial; its purpose is to 
gather as much information as possible concerning a particular, sometimes 
very limited, policy question.2 The testimonial devices of the trial process, 
on the other hand, are purifiers. Some, particularly the rules of evidence, 
actually exclude great quantities of relevant, material and often valuable 
information. Because they do not increase the quantity of information, they 
often detract from, rather than aid, the investigative function of the rulemak-
ing process.3 
While the testimonial devices of trial have received an inordinate 
amount of attention, little consideration has been given to the information-
gathering mechanisms of the judicial process. 4 These mechanisms are tradi-
tionally combined under the term discovery. This Article will discuss those 
mechanisms usually associated with discovery as they may relate to the 
rulemaking function. 
THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING 
The right to discovery is not firmly established in administrative proce-
dure, and indications are that agencies do not guarantee discovery mechan-
isms in their decision-making processes. 5 The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) makes no provision for discovery in rulemaking.6 Section 4(b) 
permits "interested persons" to submit written information, views or argu-
ments, and provides for more formal proceedings where, by statute, an 
agency's rules must be "made on a record. " 7 It is clear that the drafters of 
2. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 
105-08 (1941). 
3. Testing the truth of facts and the basis of opinion is not insignificant in rulemaking. 
Where the truth of facts is at issue, though, methods other than the trial process may in some 
cases be more efficient for testing accuracy. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
NRC, 547 F.2d 663, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
4. Discovery has been described as "the key to effective federal civil procedure," 
Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 480, 481 (1958), and 
is generally considered essential to fair litigation. See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 489. The federal 
law relating to judicial pre-trial practice is contained in FED. R. C1v. P. 26-37. 
5. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 564 (6th 
ed. 1974); B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 279 (1976). The NLRB, for example, is just now 
considering adoption of prehearing discovery. See Quarterly Meeting of Task Force on NLRB, 
91 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 286-87 (1976). 
6. See Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 381-84 (1974). 
7. APA § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). The Supreme Court has required strict in-
terpretation of the APA requirement of formal hearing in rulemaking. See United States v. 
Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel 
Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972). No procedural safeguards have been found to be constitu-
tionally mandated in rulemaking. See Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Require-
ment for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REv. 782, 785, 787 n.34 (1974). 
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the AP A envisioned the role of participants as primarily adding to the fund 
of knowledge available to the agency, and did not see "interested persons" 
as antagonists. 8 As a result, they felt no need to assure the participants an 
avenue for obtaining information for the purpose of vindicating any particu-
lar point of view. 
The absence of a specific statutory provision for discovery, however, 
does not necessarily mean that a rulemaking agency will not be required to 
provide it. Administrative agencies have been urged to provide for discov-
ery in all formal proceedings.9 Although there has been little interest in the 
establishment of discovery procedures for informal processes, 10 due process 
considerations may require the availability of some means of discovery. The 
8. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 200-01,258-59 (1946). See ArroRNEY GENERAL's 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947). 
9. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT at 89; 
Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up with the 
Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960). 
The Administrative Conference of the United States studied the problem of discovery in 
agency proceedings and made a recommendation with respect to the adoption of discovery in 
formal adjudication. Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, in 1 RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 37 (1968-70). However, the Confer-
ence specifically excluded rulemaking from its analysis: 
Formal discovery rules have apparently never been tested in administrative rulemak-
ing •... Rulemaking proceedings, even those subject to sections 7 and 8 [5 U.S.C. 
§§ 556 and 557] of the Administrative Procedure Act, raise different considerations 
which require a separate model for discovery. Rule making frequently involves large 
numbers of parties and a wide range of issues, including basic issues of national 
policy. These features are found much less frequently in adjudicatory proceedings 
and make impracticable the wholesale application of these Discovery Recommenda-
tions to rulemaking. This Report therefore does not consider the applicability of 
discovery to rulemaking. 
Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of Recommenda-
tion No. 21, in 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 577, 582 
(1968-70). A more recent Conference recommendation expands the coverage of the discovery 
scheme to formal rulemaking. Subpoena Power in Formal Rulemaking and Formal Adjudica-
tion (Recommendation No. 74-1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-1 (1976). See Explanatory Memorandum in 
Support of Recommendation 74-1: Subpoena Powers in Formal Agency Proceedings, in 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 408 (1973-74). 
For a discussion of the advisability of discovery in Food and Drug Administration formal 
rulemaking, see Hamilton 1170-75: 
The Administrative Conference has made extensive recommendations dealing 
with prehearing discovery in agency adjudications; arguably such recommendations 
should also be applicable to section 70l(e) [of the Food', Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 37l(e) (1970)] proceedings. Rulemaking on a record, however, differs from 
typical agency adjudication in two important respects: first, the issues are usually 
considerably broader in rulemaking than in adjudication; and secondly, the issues 
have been substantially explored in the proposal-comment-order portion of the sec-
tion 701(e) procedure. The danger of surprise is thus not as great as in normal 
adjudication. As a result, in rulemaking on a record the efforts of discovery should be 
directed toward isolating issues and building a record rather than toward learning 
witnesses' versions of what happened. Any discovery procedures should be carefully 
tailored to the peculiar needs of the section 701(e) procedure. 
ld. at 1171-72 (emphasis in original). 
10. See Tomlinson 92-93 (suggesting that formal discovery may detract from informal 
processes). 
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Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly 11 signaled a new approach 
to the requirement of providing an opportunity to participate. It is no longer 
sufficient for an agency to stop with the unilateral determination of whether 
or not a trial-type hearing is required by statute; the analysis must also 
include an examination of the extent to which fairness requires the availabil-
ity of some adversarial procedures. Since Goldberg, it is necessary to 
determine whether something less than a full trial-type hearing-"some 
kind of hearing" -may be appropriate where a full hearing is not. 12 This 
more flexible approach has brought about "a due process explosion" 13 in 
which procedures are being tailored to the individual decision-making proc-
ess.14 Rather than paring the right to full trial-type procedure, this approach 
opens the way to some form of public proceedings where full-trial would be 
either counter-productive or too extensive relative to the decision at hand. 
This trend is reflected in recent cases involving rulemaking procedures. 
In American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 15 Judge Leventhal suggested that 
cross-examination may be necessary in special informal rulemaking situa-
tions in the interest of fairness even though not required by statute. 16 
Although this dictum did not have immediate impact, many courts ultimate-
ly began to consider tailoring informal rulemaking procedures in accordance 
with the particular issue which had to be re~olved. 17 Most of these cases 
II. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
12. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
13. ld. at 1268. 
14. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school disciplinary proceeding); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceeding). The Goldberg opinion 
did not reach the question of what procedural safeguards are necessary where "there are no 
factual issues in dispute or where the application of the rule of law is not intertwined with 
factual issues." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268 n.15 (1970). 
15. 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). 
16. Id. at 632-33. Judge Leventhal reiterated his position in International Harvester v. 
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), contains a very enlightening dialogue between Judge Bazelon and Judge 
Leventhal. Judge Bazelon's opinion suggests that he would make cross-examination an almost 
universal requirement in rulemaking. ld. at 1003. But see National Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (separate opinion of Bazelon, C.J.). 
Apparently recognizing the substantial experience and scholarly opinion against cross-
examination in rulemaking, Judge Leventhal took the position that while cross-examination 
might have utility in formal rulemaking, it should be available only on a showing that it was the 
only method for developing the necessarY information. ld. at 1035. Accord, Walter Hohm & 
Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
17. E.g., City of Chicago v. FPA, 458 F.2d 731, 744(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
1074 (1972): 
The ability to choose with relative freedom the procedure it will use to acquire 
relevant information gives the Commission power to realistically tailor the proceed-
ings to fit the issues before it, the information it needs to illuminate those issues and 
the manner of presentation which, in its judgments, will bring before it the relevant 
information in the most efficient manner. 
See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,660 (1st Cir. 1974); Portland CementAss'n v. 
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Virgin Island 
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were premised on the notion that considerations of fairness required the 
engrafting of certain trial procedures onto the basic structure of notice and 
comment rulemaking. In one case involving a Federal Power Commission 
rule, however, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that some trial 
procedures were needed in order to permit review of the rule. 18 The court 
reasoned that in order to determine whether the Commission's findings of 
fact were supported by "substantial evidence," the statutory standard for 
review, it required a record which resembled that which would be produced 
by a tria1. 19 The decision, therefore, was based not on the utility of the trial 
procedures to the rulemaking process, but rather on the perceived need for 
such procedures to enable a subsequent reviewing court to perform its duty 
in a meaningful fashion. Two other circuits have rejected this analysis ,2° and 
the District of Columbia Circuit itself has limited the holding of the case to a 
requirement that agencies provide adequate notice to permit effective par-
ticipation. 21 The prevailing approach, therefore, is to utilize age-old and 
familiar techniques where they may be useful to the information-gathering 
and policymaking functions of rulemaking. 22 
One important procedural consideration is discovery. 23 While rulemak-
ip.g is not adversarial in the traditional sense, self-interest cannot be ignored 
Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Island Water & Power Auth., 476 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1067 (1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Even in the 
context of formal rulemaking, the tailored procedure approach affects the range of required 
procedures. See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 498-99 (E.D.N.Y. 
1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 
(1973) (written submission will be appropriate in most formal rulemaking). 
18. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir: 1973). 
19. Id. at 1257-63. 
20. Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2661 
(1976); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 851-52 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1146 (1973). 
21. In American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1974), another 
panel of the D.C. Circuit inaccurately but expediently read Judge Wilkey's opinion as holding 
merely that the FPC had failed to give notice and an adequate opportunity to participate. 
22. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. y. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); Walter Hohm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("What counts is the 
reality of an opportunity to submit an effective presentation . . . . "); cf. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 
503 F.2d 1250, 1267 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975) ("mere significance and 
complexity of the policy issues . . . do not render the . . . rejection of evidentiary hearings an 
abuse of discretion"). See generally, Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another 
Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 504-06 (1970). 
23. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (listing several devices for improving procedure, including several traditional discovery 
devices). As one commentator has noted in discussing judicial review of agency rulings, 
"[s]wift access to information is often essential if challenges to administrative action are to be 
successful." Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 895, 927 (1974). Discovery makes pleading less important. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 
8.04 (Supp. 1970). 
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and it will compel persons and groups to present the agency with informa-
tion supporting their position. This process serves to maximize the informa-
tion available to the agency. 24 Therefore, although a sense of fairness alone 
supports the availability of all the tools necessary to effective participation, 
providing those with an interest in the decision an independent means of 
uncovering information should also help to produce a better decision. 
Recognition of the potential utility of discovery is important, since any 
procedure which is not useful will almost surely be unfair to some interest. 
For example, trial procedure in FDA rulemaking may increase the fairness 
of the proceeding for the regulated industry, but the incidental delay causes 
untold injury to the consuming public. Rulemaking involves different types 
of interest groups with different perspectives on a variety of relevant issues. 
Any procedure which protects one side without regard to the overall efficacy 
of the rulemaking process will necessarily act to the detriment of other 
interest groups or perspectives, including the general "public interest." In 
examining the imposition of discovery techniques on rulemaking, therefore, 
one must be sensitive to the interplay of fairness and utility. 
APPLICATION OF THE VARIOUS DISCOVERY MECHANISMS 
TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
The term discovery encompasses several mechanisms and areas of 
analysis. The Administrative Conference's adjudicative discovery recom-
mendation dealt with nine aspects of the discovery process: prehearing 
conferences, depositions, witnesses, written interrogatories, requests for 
admission, production of documents and tangible things, role of the presid-
ing officer, protective orders, and subpoenas.25 The following discussion of 
discovery in rulemaking will also proceed according to these nine analytical 
categories. 
Prehearing Conferences 
In informal rulemaking, the APA guarantees only an opportunity to 
present written comment. 26 Nonetheless, agencies are resorting to oral 
24. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for 
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1300-01 (1972). On 
the other hand, there is a fear that "an open discovery system" may create a cumbersome 
record and potential for industry harassment and delay. See Pedersen, Formal Records and 
Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,86-88 (1975). Clearly, substantial controls are necessary 
for discovery in informal rulemaking, but, as one commentator had explained: 
The only rational justification for not employing discovery in administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings must be that agencies differ from courts in ways related to 
the appropriateness of discovery. 
Stanford Comment 1058. 
25. Discovery in Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 70-4), 1 C.F.R. §305.70-4 
(1976). See note 9 supra. 
26. APA § 4{b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). 
Vol. 1977:295] DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING 301 
proceedings in rulemaking with increasing frequency, and the rise of hybrid 
procedures requires or encourages agencies to permit some trial procedures. 
Thus, the potential use of prehearing conferences becomes an important 
element in rulemaking discovery. Indeed, even where only written proce-
dures are contemplated, meetings with the various interest groups may often 
be an effective tool in assuring a successful rulemaking proceeding. 
(a) Prehearing conferences to deal with complex or obscure subject 
matter. It has been recognized for years that pretrial conferences can act in 
several ways to untangle complex and shapeless controversies. Particularly 
in protracted litigation, pretrial conferences have been used to trim the 
controversy down to size and to focus the proceeding on the major contested 
issuesP In rulemaking, conferences may also be necessary just to identify 
the issues raised by the proposed rule. 28 When an agency is contemplating 
an initial expedition into a virgin policy area, the very nature of the issues 
may be obscure.29 Thus, the agency typically begins the rulemaking process 
with less understanding than when it begins an administrative adjudication, 
but will reach a result which may have substantially greater effect and will 
be subject to only limited judicial scrutiny. 3° Conferences permit the agency 
to assess the number and variety of questions raised by a proposed rule and 
to determine what must be accomplished during the rulemaking process 
before it can confidently issue a final rule. By uncovering subtle problems 
and by defining or settling disputed issues, the prehearing conference can 
serve to mark the very direction of rulemaking. 
In addition, prehearing conferences can be used to define the issues on 
which cross-examination will be afforded in rulemaking, either formal or 
hybrid, which incorporates some degree of trial procedures. The prehearing 
conference will help to define the specific issues that are appropriate for 
testimonial devices and limit the use of those devices to the type of issues for 
27. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE 
TRIAL OF PROTRACfED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351, 385-86 (1960). See Burch, Discovery Procedures 
and Techniques Before Government Boards of Contract Appeals, 4 Pus. CONTRACf L.J. 119, 
133-34 (1971). 
28. See Hamilton 1165 (noting practical problems in using pre-trial conferences in FDA 
formal rulemaking); Tomlinson 97. See generally JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE, supra note 27, at 
386-87; Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace With Modem Court-Developed 
Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1959-60). 
The EPA, for example, uses a "two round process." The first round serves to define the 
controversy in order to develop the proposed rule, which is the subject of the second round. 
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401,451-54 (1975). The FAA, CAB, FPC and ICC apparently 
use prehearing procedures similar to but less formalized than the prehearing conference 
approach suggested here. Id. at 451 n.237. · 
29. Experimentation is one of the major benefits of rulemaking. See American Airlines, 
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624,633 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) ("It is the 
kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings."). 
30. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES§ 658 (1976). 
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which they are best suited. Groups with similar views on these issues can be 
identified and representatives chosen to conduct the cross-examination. 31 
Where the opportunity for cross-examination is not institutionalized, the 
disclosure of issues may enable the participants to demonstrate a need for it 
in the particular case. 
The typically broad range of issues and interests involved in a rulemak-
ing would therefore appear to make the prehearing conference almost 
essential. However, an objection to the adaptation of this device to rulemak-
ing could be based on the diversity and number of interested persons. In 
most rulemaking situations, there are three general groups of potential 
participants: the industry, the interested public and the agency. Ordinarily, 
the proceeding is dominated by the industry and the agency. 32 But where the 
rulemaking visibly affects the public, representatives from numerous seg-
ments of "the public" may participate. Thus, in some situations, rulemak-
ing takes on the character of a multiple class action controversy. The diffuse 
nature of the inquiry means that a prehearing conference will not be a 
preliminary encounter of two opposing parties, but rather an interaction 
among members of an amorphous mass of participants. Because the 
rulemaking process itself is likely to be an informal exchange of information 
and views, the prehearing conference could usurp these functions if all the 
various interests were to participate. Thus, if prehearing conferences are to 
be used in rulemaking, participation in the conferences must somehow be 
allocated among narrowly defined interests. Yet, can anything be accom-
plished if all interested persons are not involved? The answer may be that 
several prehearing conferences should be held between the agency staff and 
the various interested groups.33 Each interest group's problems can be 
worked out separately between the group and the agency, and the prehearing 
conference can serve to inform the agency of each group's point of view. In 
this way, the controversies may at least be mitigated, if not resolved, as to 
some groups. 
31. Once these determinations are made, the workability of the hybrid process demands 
that the participants adhere strictly to the restrictions. See Hamilton 1169. 
32. See Hamilton 1182. The affected industry, however, is often a diverse group. See Yale 
Note 832-33. For example, in an FrC food advertising rulemaking, the presiding officer 
segregated the interested persons into the following groups: manufacturers and trade associa-
tions; the cholesterol industry (known affectionately as the "Fats and Fatty Acid people"); 
retailers; the health, natural and organic foods industry; advertising and media interests; and 
consumers and consumer groups (the one non-industry group). In the Matter of Proposed Trade 
Regulation Rule Concerning Food Advertising [16 C.F.R. Part 437], Public Record No. 215-40: 
"Presiding Officer's Notice Identifying Groups with the Same or Similar Interests in the 
Proceedings" (Apr. 22, 1976). 
33. See Tomlinson 95: "Complex cases may require a series of prehearing conferences, 
some of them quite informal and off the record." 
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(b) Prehearing conferences and settlement. Traditionally, one of the 
primary purposes of prehearing conferences is to facilitate consideration of 
settlement. 34 Admittedly, the notion of settlement appears somewhat incon-
sistent with the concept of general public participation in policy-making 
through rulemaking. Despite this apparent incompatibility, however, settle-
ment may have a place in the overall rulemaking process. 
Settlement always involves a weighing of the merits of the agreement 
and the cost of continued litigation against the benefits to be lost through 
concession. In rulemaking, the costs of proceeding are much less for those 
adversely affected than in formal adjudication, and hence, the incentives to 
settle are less apparent. 35 
Justifying a settlement presents another practical obstacle. The govern-
ment always has a problem in settlement negotiation, because it must weigh 
''the public interest''-a nebulous term which affords ample opportunity for 
second-guessing. It is also very difficult for government staff attorneys to 
defend a settlement, especially on the basis of pessimistic estimates of the 
chance of success. 36 A government admission that a proposal is weak .leaves 
the agency open to criticism from both interested parties and the public. The 
private party will contend that the rule never should have been proposed if 
the government did not have a sound basis, and members of the public may 
assert that the support for the proposed rule was deficient because of agency 
incompetence. In addition, disagreement over the value of the concession is 
inevitable as is the charge that one group is more disadvantaged by the 
settlement than another. 
Rulemaking magnifies these practical difficulties. In the first place, 
rulemaking involves policy judgments rather than determinations of specific 
factual issues. As a result, an agency negotiating a settlement immediately 
falls into the role of a "co-conspirator" with the target industry. 37 Striking a 
bargain on policy decisions delegated to the agency, it may be argued, is a 
corruption of the agency's role in the legislative scheme. Often the agency is 
charged by Congress with responsibility to fill in the policy details of 
legislation. The agency can consult the industry and the public; indeed, that 
is the purpose and value of rulemaking. But it is not part of the agency's 
34. See Tomlinson 95. 
35. The industry must nonetheless weigh the threat of ru)emaking. See Yale Note 819. The 
more formalized the proceeding, the more the cost of the process alone will encourage both the 
agency and the industry to compromise. Hamilton, Procedures, supra note 24, at 1287. 
36. FDA bargains to avoid formal rulemaking have been alleged to be contrary to the public 
interest. Hamilton, Procedures, supra note 24, at 1290. 
37. Characterization of agencies as "captured" or clientele-oriented is one of the most 
consistent complaints in administrative law. Actually, it is probably less a case of actual 
corruption than of myopia bred from close association. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 5, 
at 1020-21. 
304 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1977:295 
legitimate function to bargain on the proper application of legislation to an 
industry. 38 While it might concede some facts in exchange for concession on 
other facts, and then agree to a settlement based on these concessions, it 
cannot support ~ finding as to the best policy by agreement with the 
industry. It must make its own independent policy judgment. 
Furthermore, the necessary exclusiveness of participation in the settle-
ment process deviates from the goal of permitting a wide range of contribu-
tion in rulemaking. The principles of rulemaking are not satisfied where 
only a single interest is consulted, even if that interest is the one most 
affected by the proposed rule. 39 Although the notice and comment proce-
dures are intended to assure certain rights for the target of a rule, they are 
also intended to provide input of adequate information for decision-
making40 and avenues of participation for others who will be less directly 
affected by the rule. 
In spite of these conceptual problems, the settlement function of pre-
hearing conferences can be important in rulemaking, and an effort should be 
made to accommodate the participatory rights of all interest groups to 
settlement. If the affected industry concedes the factual predicate of a 
proposed rule, the disputed factual issues as between the industry and the 
agency are resolved, and the parties to the settlement concede any participa-
tory rights they might have. The settlement can then be legitimized by notice 
of the agreement and an opportunity for written comment. 41 Participation in 
addition to written comment hinges on the existence of "disputed issues of 
material fact. " 42 Since the settlement presumes the resolution of such 
issues, written comments must demonstrate why an oral or hybrid proceed-
ing is necessary despite the settlement, and if no such showing is made, the 
settlement may be finalized without resort to such procedures. · 
This abbreviated settlement procedure would appear to be permissible 
despite its bypass of participatory rights. In the course· of a recent FI'C 
rulemaking, for example, the target industry offered a settlement to the 
38. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 88 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977): 
[W]e are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules we are reviewing 
here may have been by compromise among the contending industry forces, rather 
than by exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest the Communica-
tion Act vests in individual commissioners. 
39. See Yale Note 818. 
40. See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
1074 (1972); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969); Pacific Coast European 
Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965). 
41. The agency should provide evidence demonstrating that it dealt with the comments. 
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Yale 
Note 820-21, 824, 832 (noting that the SEC often opens informal settlements to comments after 
it is virtually locked into the bargain). 
42. FTC Improvement Act§§ 202(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(c) (Supp. 1976); Securities Ex· 
change Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e)(4) (Supp. 1976); K. DAVIS, supra note 30, §§ 6.01-.03. See 
Walter Hohm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("critical issues"). 
Vol. 1977:295] DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING 305 
agency. 43 The industry offered to stipulate to the disputed issues of material 
fact in exchange for some concessions in the substance of the rule. The FrC 
statute requires an oral hearing and some cross-examination where there are 
disputed issues of material fact. 44 Where the agency finds no disputed issue, 
as it would be justified in doing where it has reached an agreement with the 
affected industry, these additional procedures are not required. The FrC 
can, therefore, settle the case with notice of the proposed settlement and an 
offer of an opportunity to make a written submission raising disputed factual 
issues. If no one can raise a legitimate disputed issue of material fact, the 
agency may dispense with further participation and make the necessary 
policy judgment on the basis of stipulated facts. While the policy judgment 
must be solely the decision of the agency, there is no reason why that 
judgment cannot be tempered by the industry's settlement proposal and the 
benefits which will accrue from industry cooperation. If the agency decides 
not to accept the settlement, then, as in adjudication, the industry has the 
right to insist on the full procedures due. 
(c) Conferences in lieu of hybrid procedures. In his study of hybrid 
rulemaking, Professor Williams discovered that agencies may use what he 
termed ''inquiry conferences'' --conferences with special interest groups in 
lieu of hybrid proceedings rather than in anticipation of such proceedings. 45 
These conferences are intended to resolve certain issues which are of 
concern to a particular interest group, usually the affected industry, through 
exchanges between the agency staff and representatives of the interest. The 
exchanges are to be substituted for testimonial rights such as cross-
examination. Although many situations may arise where such conferences 
would be appropriate, an agency considering the technique should exercise 
caution to assure that there is no infringement of the participatory rights of 
others who are not members of the affected industry. 
(d) Preproposal conferences. At the opposite end of the spectrum is 
the preproposal conference, which is used to explore the feasibility of some 
form of regulation with the industry. 46 The advantage of such conferences is 
43. In the Matter of Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on "Disclosure of Combustion 
Characteristics in the Marketing and Certification of Cellular Plastics," Motion by Staff 
Requesting Hearing Officer to Seek Commission Authorization to Accept Proposed Condition-
al Stipuation and Agreement (Aug. 1, 1975). Section 202 of the FfC Improvement Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. IV 1974), incorporates much of the best thinking relating to hybrid 
rulemaking. Congress no doubt will use it as a model for the future. See Gordon v. New York 
Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 680.81 (1975); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e) (Supp. 1976) (recent 
amendment to an SEC rulemaking provision). Therefore, study of the FfC's efforts in imple-
menting this procedure is particularly valuable, and these efforts will be used as examples. 
44. FfC Improvement Act§ 202(c) (1) (b), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(b) (Supp. IV 1974). 
45. Williams, supra note 28, at 451-54. 
46. See Hamilton 1162 (suggesting informal preliminary opinions by the agency as a means 
of bringing out enforcement problems). 
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that they permit the investigation of the subject without committing the 
agency so far toward regulation that it is politically unable to withdraw. 47 
The agency should be careful, however, to avoid institutionalized "infor-
mal" preproposal conferences. The rulemaking process is itself an inves-
tigative, policy-making technique. A rule proposal represents a determina-
tion that some problem exists. This determination is solely within the 
province of the agency and should not involve the industry. The industry 
should be consulted only to determine whether something can be done about 
the regulatory problem that the agency finds to exist. Instead of holding 
clandestine meetings with the industry prior to a proposal in order to enable 
it to abandon unwise rulemaking without publicity, the agency should 
recognize that it is not committed to every rule once it is proposed. The 
value of public participation in policy decisions should outweigh whatever 
pressure the agency feels to issue a rule once rulemaking is initiated. If the 
record of the public rulemaking supports the abandonment of the regulation, 
then the agency is not only justified in not promulgating a final rule, but is 
compelled not to do so. 
(e) Prehearing conferences to develop procedures. The prehearing 
conference may also serve a function in rulemaking which it rarely serves in 
adjudication-it can be used to arrive at particularized procedures in each 
specific case. 48 This approach appropriately advances the concept of tailored 
or hybrid procedures. Public and industry contributions to the determination 
of what procedure is necessary will certainly enhance the procedural tailor-
ing. In addition, procedure negotiated by the participants will be more likely 
to withstand the scrutiny of judicial procedural review. Even where the 
agency refuses to provide all of the procedures demanded by interested 
persons, the negotiation process will promote careful consideration of alter-
native procedures. While a court may question the adequacy of the proce-
dures selected, deference will generally be given to reasonable agency 
procedural decisions.49 Evidence of solicitation of participants' views and 
conferences on procedures will surely add weight to the hybrid procedure 
adopted by the agency. 
The FTC's experience under the FTC Improvement Act has demons-
trated the value of the prehearing conference in hybrid rule making. 50 Under 
the Improvement Act, the presiding officers meet with the groups of par-
47. See Yale Note 837-38. 
48. Cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 16(4) (pre-trial conference used to consider limitation on expert 
witnesses). 
49. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976); FCC v. 
Schrieber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), and cases cited therein. 
50. Interview with William D. Dixon, Chief of Rulemaking Presiding Officers at the FTC 
(Aug. 9, 1976). 
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ticipants before the oral hearing to discuss procedure. This process alerts the 
participants to how the hybrid procedure will operate. In addition, it permits 
resolution of the major procedural question: the handling of cross-
examination. The FrC Improvement Act process is pased on an initial 
designation of certain issues as appropriate for testimonial hearing51 and 
envisions limits on cross-examination. At the prehearing conference, the 
presiding officer can find out which interest groups will cross-examine on 
particular issues and whether several groups can be combined for purposes 
of cross-examination. In this way, the presiding officer can maintain the 
necessary control over the testimonial proceeding. 52 The prehearing confer-
ence also benefits participants by permitting exploration into testimony 
which will be presented at the oral hearing, thus enabling them to plan their 
approach to cross-examination. 
In short, prehearing conferences have become an integral part of the 
FrC's procedural engineering under the FrC Improvement Act. This ex-
perience indicates that prehearing conferences could be profitably employed 
in most informal rulemaking to particularize procedures, especially where 
some testimonial opportunity will be afforded. 
(f) The exchange of information. Another traditional function of the 
prehearing conferences is to foster the exchange of information. In trial 
practice, the rise of the prehearing conference reflects the modern abhor-
rence of forensic gamesmanship. Conferences present the parties with an 
opportunity, and' increasingly with compulsion, to disclose much of their 
respective cases before trial in order to take the element of surprise out of the 
litigation. One of the purposes of the Administrative Conference recommen-
dation for extensive discovery in agency adjudications53 was to remove 
surprise from such adjudication by encouraging the early exchange of 
information.54 Indeed, the Conference envisioned the exertion of consider-
51. Procedures and Rules of Practice for the Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. §1.12 
(1977). 
52. Consistent with the flexibility intended in the Improvement Act, some presiding offic-
ers have found it useful in many instances to bargain time limits in exchange for granting the 
cross-examiners freedom to probe any issue. The consensus of FTC presiding officers seems to 
be that, in cases which are not confined to specific questions of fact, it is virtually impossible to 
determine whether a particular question is or will be relevant to a disputed issue. Interview with 
Chief Presiding Officer William D. Dixon (Aug. 9, 1976) and with Presiding Officer Christopher 
Keller (Aug. 10, 1976). FTC staff attorneys agree with this approach. Interview with FTC 
Attorney Ellis Ratner (Aug. 11, 1976). For a discussion of the problems which arise with respect 
to the issue designation approach of the FTC Improvement Act see Kestenbaum, Rulemaking 
Beyond APA: Criteria for Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo. WASH. 
L. REV. 679 (1976). 
53. See note 9 supra. 
54. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 8.15 at 392 (Supp. 1970): "The most important feature of 
the recommendation is emphasis upon the prehearing conference as a device for directing 
parties to exchange their evidentiary exhibits mid witness lists." 
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able pressure on the parties in administrative adjudication to exchange 
information prior to hearing. This has in fact occurred, and many agencies 
now require the exchange of information prior to adjudication. 55 
A voiding the specter of participants arguing without complete access to 
their adversaries' information is no less a worthy goal in informal rulemak-
ing. Yet the probem takes on a substantially different gloss in the rulemak-
ing context. A participant is not surprised to his disavantage by information 
disclosed for the first time at an oral proceeding because the record remains 
open so that additional evidence can be entered into the record afterwards. A 
participant may be disadvantaged, however, when information is submitted 
too near the closing of the record to permit meaningful comment. This 
practice endangers the efficacy of the entire notice and comment procedure 
and results in a poorer record for the rulemaking agency. 
Unfortunately, agencies do not immediately place all the information 
they possess on the public record, and there is no incentive for private 
participants to submit written comment prior to the closing of the record. 
Some mechanism should be established to assure that the participants will 
come forward with information sufficiently early to elicit responsive com-
ment. Prehearing conferences would be one way to accomplish this: as in 
adjudication, the presiding agency employee should have the power to 
compel participants, including the agency staff, to come forward with 
information in sufficient time to permit comment. 56 A problem arises in 
informal rulemaking when, as is often the case, there is no presiding officer. 
Under these circumstances, the agency should instruct its staff to disclose 
immediately all relevant information in its possession to insure the effective 
solicitation of public participation. 57 In turn, the staff should be empowered 
to pressure private participants, especially those directly interested, such as 
the members of the affected industry, to submit their information early 
enough to permit comment and rebuttal. The comment process will thereby 
become a dialogue among interested persons and eliminate to some extent 
the need for testimonial devices for disputing information in the rulemaking 
record. 
(g) Official notice. In adjudicatory proceedings, preheating confer-
ences also serve to inform the parties of areas where official notice might be 
55. See Tomlinson 96-97 (listing some of the agencies which provide for exchange of 
information). 
56. Tomlinson advocates a strong presiding officer to handle discovery in adjudications, 
noting that the success of agency proceedings will depend on the competence of the presiding 
officer. Id. at 97-98. The FTC experience to date suggests that the presiding officer can make a 
significant difference in the success of hybrid rulemaking. See notes 50-52 supra and accom-
panying text. 
57. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 94-98 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977). 
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taken. 58 As Professor Davis has suggested, official notice can often be taken 
of "legislative facts"-"general facts which help the tribunal decide ques-
tions of law and policy and discretion"-which are at issue in an adjudicat-
ory proceeding. 59 Since rulemaking involves primarily the making of policy 
judgments, it is generally a search for such legislative facts. Therefore, 
official notice could eliminate the conceptual need for a factual predicate to 
support a rule. Since this result cannot be permitted, the practice of taking 
official notice would seem to be of little utility. 
There remain, however, two potential uses of the official notice device. 
First, the agency, like a court, can take notice of those things which are 
indisputable among reasonable people, such as generally accepted facts, 
statutes or studies. 60 Second, the agency can use something in the nature of 
official notice to distinguish those facts which it feels are genuinely in 
dispute from those which it assumes are settled. The prehearing conference 
presents an excellent opportunity for the presiding officer, or the agency 
through its staff, to disclose the issues considered settled or worthy of only 
abbreviated discussion and for the participants to disabuse the agency of any 
notion that an issue is not controversial. 61 
(h) Public or private prehearing conferences. One final question is 
whether prehearing conferences must be ''on the record.' ' 62 Industry repre-
sentatives would obviously prefer to meet with the agency staff off the 
record.63 The propriety of off-the-record conferences involves the conflict 
between the value of closed-door candidness64 and the prospect of indus-
try-agency deals which are never disclosed. Off the record candor, however, 
serves little purpose in policy-making, which involves policy judgment 
rather than fact-finding. Covert advocacy of policy, in fact, presents a real 
danger of improper influence. In rulemaking, therefore, the agency should 
rarely consider any material which it does not disclose to the public. 65 
58. See Tomlinson 99-100. 
59. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, §15.02 at 353 (1958); see id. § 7.02; Davis, An Approach to 
Problems in Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-10 (1942). 
60. 'See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE§ 200 (1975). 
61. Pedersen, supra note 24, at 68 n.lll, noted the problems of adding newly discovered 
supporting information to a rulemaking record. The official notice process may solve this 
problem by enabling the agency to add the information with notice to participants and opportun-
ity to rebut. 
62. The APA clearly envisioned a "nonpublic investigatory proceeding." APA § 6(b), 5 
U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970). See Yale Note 836-37 (discussing the pros and cons of candor engen-
dered by off-the-record conferences). 
63. See Williams, supra note 28, at 434 (discussing a situation in which the industry 
representative was willing to exchange the right to cross-examine for an off-the-record 
meeting with the staff). See also E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FrC, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933); 
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: The 
Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 404 (1968) (favoring open hearings). 
64. See Williams, supra note 28, at 454. 
65. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 94-98 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977). 
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Although some factual information may justifiably be kept off the record,66 
policy arguments should never be presented in non-public conferences. 
Thus, prehearing conferences, though they need not be open to the public, 
should never be totally off the record. Where transcripts are not taken and 
disclosed, minutes should be prepared for inclusion in the public record of 
the rulemaking. The minutes should contain the exact terms of any bargains 
struck between an interest group and the agency staff, 67 as well as a 
summary of any material information disclosed or arguments presented in 
the conferences. In general, there does not appear to be any reason why a 
prehearing conference with specific groups of participants cannot be open to 
public observation as long as there are limits for practical reasons on who 
may contribute. 
Depositions 
Depositions in federal trials and agency adjudications are generally 
limited to preserving testimony. 68 Therefore, there would seem to be no 
reason to provide for depositions in rulemaking. 69 Written submissions can 
become part of the rulemaking record without being introduced in an oral 
proceeding. Theoretically, written material stands on the same footing as 
oral evidence, and it would appear that, even after a hybrid proceeding, an 
agency could base a rule on nothing more than written submissions. 
Nonetheless, the requirement of hybrid procedures appears to include 
an implicit assumption that oral testimony should be given greater weight 
than written submissions, particularly when the oral testimony has been 
"tested" by cross-examination. A careful participant might, therefore, wish 
to preserve the testimony of an important witness through deposition be-
cause it would then stand on the same footing as the "evidence" developed 
in a trial-type record.70 Rather than encouraging such use of depositions, the 
66. An exception should be made for rare instances of confidential information which 
should be covered by a protective order or assurance of confidential treatment. See text 
accompanying notes 186-93 infra. 
67. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring the court to disclose the agreements reached in pre-
trial conference). 
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(l); Burch, supra note 27, at 151. See generally Mezines & 
Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. REv. 55, 59-62 (1966) 
(discussing FfC deposition practice); Stanford Comment 1043 (noting that prior practice and 
legislative history of 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4), authorizing depositions "whenever the ends of 
justice would be served thereby," suggest that the section was not intended to authorize 
depositions for discovery purposes). 
In administrative agency practice, the granting or denying of depositions rests in the 
discretion of the presiding officer. APA § 7(b)(4}, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (1970). See NLRB v. 
C.H. Sprague & Son Co., 428 F.2d 938, 940 (1st Cir. 1970). 
69. See Burch, supra note 27, at 154. 
70. It is important to recognize that the terms "record" and "evidence" are not as limited 
in rulemaking as in formal adjudication. In formal proceedings, the term "evidence" connotes 
information which has passed through the procedural filters which limit variety and quantity. In 
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agency involved in the rulemaking should inform the participants that 
written and oral evidence are of equal stature71 and should suppress what-
ever preference it may have for oral testimony. The reliability of written 
evidence can be demonstrated; it can be subjected to testing in the nature of 
cross-examination if included in the public record early enough in the 
proceeding to permit written comment and rebuttal. The primary function of 
depositions, therefore, can be fulfilled in rulemaking by proper use of 
written submissions. 
Nor should depositions be used for discovery purposes in rulemaking. 
The great number of potential participants and sources of relevant informa-
tion make it necessary to curtail even written interrogatories, which are 
much less burdensome and time consuming than oral depositions. 72 
Witnesses 
Although those who participate in rulemaking and witnesses in formal 
adjudication are conceptually distinguishable, in practice they may be quite 
similar, particularly when the rulemaking is a hybrid proceeding. The 
Administrative Conference recommended the exchange of witness lists and 
narrative summaries of testimony in formal proceedings. 73 Where rulemak-
ing includes any oral proceeding, this recommendation is equally valid. 
Where there is a hybrid proceeding with some possibility of crqss-
rulemaking, on the other hand, experience shows that immaterial and irrelevant information, 
both factual and non-factual, often finds its way into the records. It has been impossible, 
however, to purge the rulemaking lexicon of the term "evidence." Similarly, the term "record" 
itself has an expanded scope in rulemaking, for a rule's "factual predicate," City of Chicago v. 
FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972), contains great 
quantities of information of varying value and relevancy. See, e.g., FfC Improvement Act§ 
202(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1974): "The term 'evidence' ... means any matter in 
the rulemaking record"; id. §202(e)(l)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(l)(B): "The term 'rulemaking 
record' means the rule, its statement of basis and purpose, the transcript ... , any written 
submissions, and any other information which the Commission considers relevant to such 
rule." 
71. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Court reviewed a 
record containing only written information submitted to an agency under 5 U.S.C. § 553). 
72. See Hamilton 1172 (asserting that depositions are not desirable for FDA formal 
rulemaking). Written interrogatories and written questions as to methodology should be prefer-
red to oral testimony with cross-examination. This observation has special force in extra-
hearing oral proceedings. 
73. Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, supra note 9, § 3(b). 
Hamilton, Rulemaking on the Record, 26 Fooo, DRUG & Cos. L.J. 627, 636 (1971) (a similar 
recommendation for formal rulemaking at the FDA). The Jencks rule, requiring the government 
to disclose to a criminal defendant all prior statements by prosecution witnesses in the posses-
sion of the prosecution which relate to the witnesses' testimony, see Jencks v. United States, 
353 U.S. 657 (1957), is often applied to agency proceedings, and it is often expanded to require 
disclosure of witness statements before the hearing. Ideally, there should be no Jencks problem 
in rulemaking. The agency should place in the public record as soon as possible all information 
in its possession, including witness statements. 
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examination, such an exchange is essential. Even in hybrid rulemaking, 
cross-examination will be closely restricted and some procedure for the 
identification of witnesses and the disclosure of expected testimony permits 
potential participants to determine which witnesses they will cross-examine 
and how much cross-examination they wish of a particular witness. Such 
disclosure also enables the presiding agency employee to designate repre-
sentative groups and to judge how much cross-examination to permit. 74 
Where no right of cross-examination is established in a particular agency's 
rulemaking process, the disclosure of witness identity and summary of 
testimony may form the basis on which one seeking the right to cross-
examine can advocate the need for some cross-examination of a particular 
witness.75 
The FTC uses a procedure involving prehearing discussions and the 
disclosure of witnesses and testimony in conducting rulemaking under its 
model hybrid procedure. In fact, it has proven to be the only method by 
which rulemaking can be conducted under the Improvement Act. FTC 
presiding officers have been able to manage cross-examination successfully 
because they know what to expect and how much. In short, this process 
gives the presiding officers the control necessary to make testimonial proce-
dures practical in rulemaking. 76 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may discover ''the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter.' m A participant in rulemaking should be able to obtain this same 
information from the agency. A rulemaking agency should be required to 
disclose the identity of all persons who have special knowledge about the 
subject matter. In addition, unlike the federal judicial practice, the agency 
should be required at the earliest possible time to disclose those persons 
74. See Tomlinson 119-20. 
75. See Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 476 F.2d 
1263, 1268-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973) (cross-examination denied because of 
failure to demonstrate inadequacy of written questions). Compare Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643-44 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proffer adequate to support 
some additional procedures) with National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 
782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proffer failed to support additional procedures). 
76. A high FTC official suggested to the author that the FTC Improvement Act hybrid 
procedure has been made to work by brute force: the presiding officers have made it work 
through a triumph of will. Interview with assistant to the general counsel, Barry Rubin, (Aug. 9, 
1976). 
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Use of the word "matter" rather than "fact" indicates that the 
inquiry may include persons who might disclose opinions. See Panzer, The New Federal 
Discovery Rules in Civil Cases, in NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK 216 (\V, 
Treadwell ed. 1972). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 400 (3d ed. 1970) (stating 
that it has been routinely held that a party may be required to disclose the names of "occurr-
ence witnesses"). 
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whom it may call as witnesses.78 In informal rulemaking, however, private 
individuals should not be required to disclose the ide~tity of all those having 
information relating to the rule, but should at some time before the hearing 
disclose the identity of persons who will submit either written or oral 
presentations on their behalf. 
Federal Rule 26(b)(4), which provides for the discovery of an oppos-
ing party's experts, could also be adapted to rulemaking. The rule draws a 
distinction between experts expected to be called as witnesses and experts 
who are consulted in preparation for trial, and precludes discovery of 
experts who are informally consulted, but not retained or specially em-
ployed for the litigation.79 It provides a broad range of discovery of those 
experts to be called as witnesses, but such discovery is limited to inter-
rogatories. 80 In order to question an expert who is merely consulted, the 
opposing party must make "a showing of exceptional circumstances under 
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or 
opinions on the same subject by the other means. " 81 The major impediment 
to adapting similar discovery to rulemaking is the absence of the limiting 
concept of "party." On the other hand, because of the nature of most 
rulemaking, a special effort should be made to provide expert testimony or 
written submissions. Thus, rather than relying on such private discovery, 
the agency staff should make a special effort to uncover and disclose the 
identities of experts in the field. In order to uncover such experts, the agency 
staff should request that the "more interested" participants, for instance the 
regulated industry, disclose experts whom they perceive as being able to 
contribute. The right of interested persons to question experts who do not 
volunteer to contribute should, however, be severely limited, particularly 
when the expert does not intend to testify either on behalf of an interest or on 
his own. In these situations, private discovery should be permitted only 
under the "exceptional circumstances" standard set forth above. Where an 
interested party demonstrates that an expert will be of assistance, the agency 
itself should seek out and obtain information from the expert, particularly 
where the interested person does not have the resources to pay an expert 
fee. 82 In this way, the agency takes on the expense of expert advice in 
78. The agency should, however, be able to claim the same privilege against revealing 
informants available in adjudication. See Stewart & Ward, FI'C Discovery: Depositions, The 
Freedom of Information Act and Confidential Informants, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 248,258 (1968). 
The informant privilege, though, must yield to a sho~ing of "good cause for revelation," see 
Gellhorn 169-70. Cf. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr 10 (1975). 
79. See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 504 
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). 
81. Id. 26(b)(4)(B). 
82. The Federal Rules require payment of expert fees. Id. 26(b)(4)(C). An expert should 
not be expected to donate the very services from which he makes a living. 
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formulating its policy. This imposition seems justified since, unlike adjudi-
cation in which individual interests are more directly at stake, rulemaking 
furthers the agency's interest by permitting it to carry out a duty assigned by 
Congress. 
Written Interrogatories 
Written interrogatories have proven to be an inexpensive discovery 
tool, 83 and for that reason alone they would be useful in informal rulemak-
ing. But there is another compelling reason for incorporating interrogatory 
procedure into the rulemaking process: written interrogatories may be an 
essential alternative to compelling a greater shift to trial-type, testimonial 
procedures. 84 Written submissions are the backbone of informal rulemak-
ing, even where some trial procedures are permitted. Nonetheless, there 
must be a method for testing the submission or for exploring the written 
comments in greater depth. Written interrogatories can be used for this 
purpose. 
Use of written interrogatories could greatly reduce the need for cross-
examination. Although cross-examination of experts has been thought to be 
particularly useful, 85 written exchange might often produce more reliable 
information. 86 The record formed by interrogatories would no doubt be 
more direct and understandable than a record formed by transcripts of oral 
questions. Moreover, written questions would create the opportunity for 
83. See Tomlinson 121. 
84. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(written questions may substitute for cross-examination); accord, O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 
F.2d 59,61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Currie, Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 
U. CHI. L. REv. 457, 471-72 (1975) (asserting that, for state pollution control agency, trial 
procedures were more efficient than written interrogatories). 
85. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 521-23; see also Clagett, Informal Action-
Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 
DUKE L.J. 51, 79 (suggesting that an expert may be profitably cross-examined even on 
legislative facts). But see Hamilton 1156 (asserting that the prospect of cross-examination has 
alienated experts from the FDA). 
86. See Prettyman, How to Try a Dispute Under Adjudication by an Administrative 
Agency, 45 VA. L. REv. 179, 190 (1959). Expert witnesses do not always make a strong personal 
impression on the stand. Yet given the sanctuary of carefully considered written answers, they 
will display the value of their opinion, not in their demeanor, but in the quality of their 
scholarship. Professor Wigmore, although characterizing cross-examination as "the greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth," conceded that it may do more harm 
than good with respect to testimony of experts. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1367 (J. Chadbourn 
rev. ed. 1974). See Up john Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944,955 (6th Cir. 1970) ("No amount of ..• 
cross-examination can change scientific studies and data . . . . "). But see Robinson, supra 
note 22, at 521-24; Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Examination of 
Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 39, 95-97 (1971) (pointing out 
countervailing considerations which might support cross-examination of experts). 
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exchange between opposing experts rather than between an attorney and an 
expert. The caliber of the exchange would certainly be enhanced if, instead 
of educating an attorney so that he might cross-examine, the expert com-
municated directly with his counterpart. 87 
In judicial proceedings and formal agency proceedings, interrogatories 
must be directed at "parties. " 88 In rulemaking, if all participants are 
considered ''parties'' for purposes of discovery. then anyone who com-
ments will face the possibility of receiving a request to answer inter-
rogatories. If uncontrolled authority to serve interrogatories is given to 
participants, as under the Federal Rules,89 the result could be extremely 
detrimental. Procedural control should be maintained by routing inter-
rogatories through the agency or its delegate. The presiding officer or an 
employee in charge of rulemaking discovery should screen the requests to 
eliminate redundancy and other unnecessary burdens. 90 
Control of interrogatories, however, should not be left to ad hoc· 
determinations. A rational, controlled program for making interrogatories 
available demands that the agency develop guidelines for their issuance. 
These guidelines should establish general categories of substantive content 
which will or will not be subject to interrogatories. The guidelines should 
also define the types of participants who will be subject to interrogatories. 
Certainly some participants, such as an industry trade association, are more 
interested than others and can be fairly expected to answer interrogatories, 
upon direction from the agency. In general, interrogatories should be per-
missible only when directed at significantly interested persons: those im-
mediately affected by the rule who are active in getting comments into the 
record and who indicate that they intend to participate fully in the proceed-
ing. In addition, those subject to interrogatories should be categorized 
according to their ability to answer. Interrogatories should perhaps be 
permitted only to such larger participants as corporations, trade associa-
. tions, groups representing the public and the agency. 
Interested persons who are the targets of interrogatories can, of course, 
87. In support of pre-trial exchange of information produced by experts, the Federal Rules 
Advisory Committee noted: "The lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently 
cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which 
he will base his judgment on the stand." RuLES ADVISORY CoMM. 503. 
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (a) (interrogatories may be served upon "any other party"); see 
Tomlinson 121. 
89. Interrogatories may be served directly on a party without leave of the court. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 33(a). 
90. See Kroll & Maciszewski, Pre-trial Discovery: Change in the Federal Rules, Discov-
ERY RULES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 77, at 206. 
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rmmmize the burden by refusing to answer the questions. Considerable 
incentive to respond will result from a calculation of the effect the refusal to 
answer questions may have on the weight of the person's submission or 
testimony and from the psychological drive to demonstrate the soundness of 
one's submission. But ultimately, there is no compulsion to respond unless 
the agency has formalized the proceeding so as to create some right to have 
interrogatories answered. Thus, the formality of the particular rulemaking 
may be an appropriate index of how much control the agency should 
exercise over interrogatories. Where the proceeding is very informal, the 
person's refusal to answer might be sufficient to prevent overwhelming 
interrogatories, but where a hybrid procedure includes some formal right to 
discovery, including interrogatories, substantial agency control is 
necessary. 91 
When the interrogatories are directed at the agency, there is a need to 
prevent delving too far into the decision-maker's mental processes.92 The 
Administrative Conference recommendation would limit interrogatories in 
agency adjudication to agency employees with knowledge of relevant 
facts. 93 This approach is as appropriate for rulemaking as it is for adjudica-
tion. Whereas rulemaking is a policy-formulating device and hence the 
thinking of the agency may be important to a participant, disclosure of the 
agency's thinking should be a function of the notice requirement rather than 
discovery.94 On the other hand, factual questions directed at the staff should 
be answered.95 In addition, because interrogatories to staff members, par-
91. Even in trials, there may be considerable freedom to refuse to answer interrogatories. 
See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1972), modified on other grounds, 485 
F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 408·09 (5th Cir. 1960). Techniques 
for enforcing interrogatories vary. See Stanford Comment 1076; FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(d). 
Under the Federal Rules, the party serving the interrogatory must move for enforcement rather 
than the answering party moving to quash. FED. R. CJV. P. 33(a). See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 
522-23. Because the proposal herein envisions initial agency involvement in judging the proprie-
ty of an interrogatory, failure to answer will be tantamount to ignoring an administrative order. 
92. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. 
NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). But see Note, 
"Mental Process" Privilege Prevents Discovery of Existence of Agency Head's Statutorily-
Required Personal Decision, 50 WASH. L. REv. 739 (1975). Compare Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (permitting some inquiry into the mental process in 
the absence of agency reasoning necessary for review) with Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 
(1973) (requiring reliance on "contemporary explanation" if available). 
93. See Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of 
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 629-31. 
94. See text accompanying note 204 infra. 
95. See Gellhorn 176. In addition, interrogatories to the agency may be necessary to 
uncover the existence or location of documents which can then be requested. See Tomlinson 
121. 
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ticularly experts, will often include matters of opinion, questions requiring 
staff opinion should be permitted as long as the opinions called for are 
intertwined with the factual inquiry, 96 and as long as the expression will not 
disclose the mental process of the ultimate decision-maker. 97 
Requests for Admission 
Admissions perform a modest role in agency adjudicatory discovery98 
and generally have little place in rulemaking. However, admissions as to 
some issues would certainly expedite the rulemaking process and focus 
attention on disputed material issues. 
Where some trial procedures are provided in both hybrid and formal 
rulemaking, requests for admission, especially those from the agency, need 
not go so far as to ask for concessions on the truth of facts. Rather, an 
interested group may be asked to admit that an issue is not a factual one or is 
not major in the decision-making. If agreement can be reached that an issue 
is a policy judgment or question of law, then the agency is justified in not 
providing testimonial procedures and may decide the issue on the basis of 
participation by oral argument or written comment. The requirement of 
some trial procedure has generally been limited to "crucial," "critical" or 
"material" factual issues, and an agency need not provide such procedure 
for minor or peripheral factual issues. Consequently, an admission that the 
resolution of certain facts is not crucial to the outcome of the rulemaking 
would justify limiting participants to writteQ. proof as to that fact. 
The use of admissions in informal rulemaking does present some 
practical difficulties. As with settlement, the major problem is the absence 
of two clearly identifiable adverse interests. Getting one group of particip-
ants to admit to an issue may not eliminate that issue as to other participants. 
Nonetheless, there may be instances where it will be profitable to ask one 
96. Under the Federal Rules, interrogatories may involve "opinion or contention that 
relate to fact or the application of law to fact," FED. R. C1v. P. 33(b); See RULES ADVISORY 
COMM. 524, and may inquire into questions of legal theories where intertwined with factual 
questions, id. at 524. The Federal Rule provision may not always be applied to administrative 
interrogatories. See Wurlitzer Co. v. EEOC, 50 F.R.D. 421 (N.D. Miss. 1970). 
97. These opinions should not be binding on the agency in any way. Except where there is 
"exceptional reliance," answers to interrogatories do not limit proof. RULES ADVISORY COMM. 
524. 
98. See Tomlinson 124. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted two purposes to be 
served by admissions: "first to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated 
from the case, and secondly, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be." RULES 
ADVISORY COMM. 531-32. A request for admission may even focus on ultimate disputed facts. 
Kroll & Maciszewski, supra note 90, at 211. 
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group to admit to certain issues. Where this is properly done, the agency 
may be justified in confining further discussion on that issue to written 
comment or even to written submission as to why the issue should not be 
resolved by the admission. 
A corollary to the use of admissions is the agency's authority to 
discipline those who refuse to admit to an issue which should not be in 
dispute. Such authority appears inconsistent with the informal rulemaking 
process. The amorphous nature of the rulemaking controversy requires the 
agency to designate which issues are of crucial importance, and a special 
interest's willingness to admit to the resolution of a question will certainly 
be relevant to this determination. But it is the power of the agency to define 
the issue of concern, not the fact that an admission was made, which is of 
primary significance in the rulemaking context. 
As an alternative to adjudicatory-type requests for admissions, pro-
posed initial findings by the agency could accompany the publication of the 
proposed rule. The initial findings should disclose assumed facts and shift to 
participants the burden of demonstrating that the assumptions are in error or, 
at least, that there is substantial controversy as to a fact which the proceed-
ing must attempt to resolve. 99 Rulemaking is a method for informing the 
agency, and this initial finding procedure can serve to disclose the areas 
where the agency most needs information. The agency will also be able to 
control the course of the proceeding and limit the issues that are considered 
to be in dispute. 
Compulsory Process 
(a) Subpoena power in general. At present, the failure of an agency 
to provide for compulsory process, even in formal adjudication, does not 
violate due process, 100 nor is there any general statutory guarantee making 
compulsory process available. 101 The APA does not guarantee compulsory 
process, or empower agencies to issue subpoenas, but provides only that a 
subpoena shall be issued to a party where an agency already has subpoena 
99. The APA provision that the proponent of a rule bears the burden of proof applies only 
to rules which must be made on a record, APA §7(c), 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1970). This requirement 
would not seem to apply to informal rulemaking. 
100. See Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 470.71 (1912); Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA, 
427 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1970). 
101. See NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union of San Pedro, 374 F.2d 974, 982 (9th 
Cir. 1967) (refusal to issue a subpoena not necessarily prejudicial); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962) (trial court abused its discretion by rendering judgment for taxpayer 
simply because the government would not allow discovery). But see FTC v. United States Pipe 
& Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D.D.C. 1969) (in FTC adjudication, party has right to 
a subpoena "on a showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought"). 
See generally I K. DAVIS, supra note I, § 8.15 (1958); K. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 298. 
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authority. 102 This provision merely attempts to place the agency and private 
parties on an equal footing. 103 
However, this equality is somewhat illusory, because agencies may 
have other investigative powers to compel disclosure of information or filing 
of reports which are not available to private persons. 104 The APA expressly 
102. APA § 6(c), 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970). 
Uniformly, agencies do not have power to enforce their own subpoenas, but must seek 
enforcement in the courts. The Constitution and considerations of fundamental fairness require 
this bifurcation of power. United States v. Security State Bank and Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 641 
(5th Cir. 1973). See Stanford Comment 1076. Thus, one can receive interlocutory review of an 
agency subpoena merely by refusing to comply. However, the degree of judicial deference to 
agency subpoena requests suggests that this review is often not worth the time and expense. 
See note 108 infra. 
Sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order are unclear under APA § 9(a), 5 
U.S.C. § 558(b) (1970), and. depend on individual enabling acts. See Stanford Comment 1051, 
1054-55. In addition to judicial enforcement through the contempt power, administrative sanc-
tions for failure to respond to discovery include refusal to permit testimony from the disobe-
dient party on pertinent issues and decision of pertinent issues adversely to the disobedient 
party. See Burch, supra note 27, at 181. See also NLRB v. C.H. Sprague & Son Co., 428 F.2d 
938, 942 (1st Cir. 1970) (agency may enforce subpoena by refusing to permit cross-examination 
"with reference to any matter which could have been produced by complying with the 
subpoena"). 
Most agencies with compulsory process procedures also provide interested persons the 
right to move to quash a subpoena issued by its staff. If an agency has a procedure for testing 
discovery orders through a motion to quash, that procedure must be exhausted before a written 
interrogatory can be challenged in court. See National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 
552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927, reh. denied, 351 U.S. 990 (1956). Also, a 
third party will not be permitted to intervene in an effort to quash the subpoena unless it has 
some privilege or proprietary interest in the proceeding. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 
U.S. 517 (1971) (taxpayer cannot intervene in IRS enforcement proceedings against his emp-
loyer in order to quash subpoena for records affecting his own tax liability); United States v. 
Moore, 485 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1973) (where the subpoena is issued to one who will 
adequately defend the third party's interest, there is no prejudice in denying third party 
intervention). 
Even where there is no provision for motion to quash, APA § 6(d), 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970), 
guarantees the right to petition the agency and the right to an explanation for a denial of the 
petition. This provision should provide the basis for a petition to quash a discovery order. A 
motion to quash should always precede a refusal to comply because by this means the agency 
will be forced to disclose its arguments for enforcing the subpoena prior to the judicial 
proceeding. Often an effective motion to quash or expression of intent to refuse to comply will 
serve best when used in conjunction with a clear intent to compromise. Agency staff will often 
agree to lesser access to avoid going through all the procedural steps necessary to enforce a 
subpoena fully. 
103. The purpose of this provision is to make agency subpoenas available to private 
parties to the same extent as to agency representatives . . . . It should be em-
phasized that Section 6(c) [5 U.S.C. § 555(d)] relates only to existing subpoena 
powers conferred upon agencies; it does not grant power to issue subpoenas to 
agencies which are not so empowered by other statutes. 
APA MANUAL supra note 8, at 67. See Tomlinson 104. 
104. See Tomlinson 124-25. See also Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 307 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Pa. 
1970) (participant has no right to reports furnished to agency under authority separate from 
subpoena power, even though participant alleged that the FTC investigative powers had been 
used as "tool of litigation" in the particular agency adjudication). 
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recognizes that many agencies have powers to make investigative demands 
which are separate and distinct from any compulsory process which may be 
available in conjunction with specific proceedings. 105 The investigative 
powers of many agencies, especially the large rulemaking agencies, may be 
exceedingly broad, 106 and the law permits very little judicial interference 
with those powers. 107 Whereas an agency can satisfy its informational needs 
through its investigative powers, the participants, even in formal proceed-
ings, must rely on the agency's discovery rules to find a means of obtaining 
information. 108 Therefore, the targets of a rulemaking will not likely have 
the s~e access to information as the agency. 
105. APA § 6(b), 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970). 
106. While the APA limits investigative demands by the language "as authorized by law," 
many agencies have broad authority to issue investigative requests. See, e.g., United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (an agency's investigative request will be enforced 
even if motivated by "nothing more than official curiosity"); EEOC v. University ofN.M., 504 
F.2d 1296, 1303 (lOth Cir. 1974) (administrative subpoenas enforceable unless "plainly incom-
petent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose"); United States v. Marshall Durbin & Co., 363 F.2d 
I, 5 (5th Cir. 1966) (FI'C may subpoena records pertinent to an investigation which are in 
possession of third person who is not the subject of such investigation); Adams v. FI'C, 296 
F.2d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962) ("broadness alone is not 
sufficient justification to refuse enforcement of a subpoena so long as the material sought is 
relevant"); cf. FI'C v. Gladstone, 450 F.2d 913, 915 (5th Cir. 1971) (even where administrative 
· subpoena enforced by court may be overbroad, one who destroys subpoenaed documents is 
guilty of criminal contempt). The burden of showing that an agency subpoena is unreasonable 
remains with the respondent. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,527 (1971); United 
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964). 
Constitutional challenges to administrative subpoenas, based on the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, are exceedingly difficult to maintain. See Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-02 (1976) (regardless of whether documents would have been 
privileged in hands of taxpayers, IRS could subpoena documents transferred to taxpayer's 
attorney in connection with an investigation); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 
(1971) ("an internal revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in 
good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution"). This traditional deference 
may be ripe for questioning. In CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976), the 
Seventh Circuit questioned the CAB's plenary inspection authority to search several broad 
categories of the carrier's records. Relying in large part on Burlington Northern, Inc. v. ICC, 
462 F.2d 280, 287-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972), the court found that the right 
to inspect was not unlimited and that an agency must describe the purpose for inspection so that 
a court can review its appropriateness. The court cited California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 
U.S. 21, 62 (1974), in which it had been pointed out that the challenged regulations "[did] not 
authorize indiscriminate rummaging among the records of the plaintiffs." The Seventh Circuit 
noted that some limited "expectation of privacy" did exist for a corporation. "In summary, the 
decisions uniformly require that an investigative demand be reasonably definite and reasonably 
relevant to some proper investigative purposes. The Board cites no case, and we have found 
none, holding that any statute has conferred a general warrant power on any agency." I d. at 
399. While the case involved the problem of inspection, the thrust of the opinion displays a 
closer examination of the agency's investigative purpose than is usual. 
107. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946); FI'C v. Feldman, 
532 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1976). 
108. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 30, at§ 8.15. 
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In addition, it is doubtful that the guarantee of equal treatment applies 
to informal rulemaking. The subpoena provision is contained in the "ancil-
lary'' section of the APA 109 which has rather general application in accord-
ance with applicability of each individual subsection. 110 Thus, while it is 
clear that certain provisions of the section could apply to rulemaking, it does 
not necessarily follow that each subsection applies to rulemaking. Although 
there is no explicit limiting language, the subponena subsection suggests 
that it was intended to apply only to formal proceedings. The use of the term 
"party" in subsection (d) compels this conclusion. While the APA defini- . 
tion of "party" is broad, 111 the notion of "party" does not coincide with the 
concept of informal rulemaking. 112 This dissonance is demonstrated by the 
APA drafters' use of "interested persons," not "parties," in section 553. 113 · 
A party is a person who is particularly focused upon in a formal proceeding. 
One who is not directly connected with a proceeding must move to intervene 
and prove sufficient interest to become a party before he may participate. 114 
In rulemaking, participation is open to anyone, and the term "party," with 
its connotation of limited access to the proceeding, is inappropriate; thus the 
language of subsection (d) implies that it was not to apply to informal 
rulemaking. 115 
109. APA § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1970). 
110. The intent of the provision was clearly to promulgate miscellaneous procedural 
categories: 
Section [555] defines various procedural rights of private parties which may be 
incidental to rulemaking, adjudication, or the exercise of any other authority. 
APA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 61; accord, S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 8, at 263. The Senate 
report's title refers to "incidental or miscellaneous rights, powers imd procedures." Id. at 204. 
In addition, the definition of agency proceeding, APA § 12(g), 5 U.S.C. § 551(12) (1970), 
includes all rulemaking. 
Ill. APA § 2(b), 5 U .S.C. § 551(3) (1970). 
112. See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185,236 (1974). 
In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (2d Cir. 1972), the concurring judge, in an 
opinion concurred in by another judge on the panel, found that "party" in section 555 referred 
to the context of a formal proceeding and not informal negotiation. He relied on the specific 
provision in section 554(c) for informal negotiation, and the same analysis would serve to 
exclude section 553 informal rulemaking procedures. The third judge seemed to lean in the 
same direction but felt the issue should not be decided until the administrative remedies had 
been exhausted. Id. at 1117 n.5. 
113. APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). 
114. However, intervention in administrative proceedings has become much easier. Public 
Participation in Administrative Hearings (Recommendation No. 71-6), 1 C.P.R. § 305.71-6A 
(1977). Leading cases liberalizing intervention include Office of Cunication of United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf., 384 U.S. 941 (1966). The trend-setting scholarly works 
include Crampton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Adminis-
trative Process, GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, 
AgenCies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968). 
115. But see A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (D. Del. 1975), vacated on 
other grounds, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976) ( 5 U.S.C. § 553, referring to "interested persons" 
rather than "parties," does not preclude application of 5 U.S~C. § 555(d)). 
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Practical considerations suppqrt this semantic argument. The Adminis-
trative Conference has found that compulsory process is inappropriate in 
informal proceedings in general and rulemaking in particular.II6 The major 
difficulty in providing compulsory process in rulemaking is the uncontrol-
lable numbers of potential participants. Rulemaking by a major federal 
agency may have national, and even international impact, and the agency's 
subpoena power is often coextensive with the reach of the proceeding. I I7 To 
permit all participants in a rulemaking access to subpoenas could result in an 
oppressive convulsion of compulsory process. 118 
On the other hand, compulsory process cannot be totally excluded from 
the participatory rights incorporated into rulemaking. 119 Discovery is neces-
sary to effective participation: it permits an interested person to defend his 
interest and, by maximizing the ability to represent an interest, it assures 
greater information on which an agency may make a decision. Compulsory 
process not only provides a tool whereby an interested person may ga,ther 
more information, it also permits an interested person the right to confront 
the information which is to be used against him. The Supreme Court has 
mandated that the targets of all. varieties of informal administrative action be 
given such an opportunity, IZO and access to compulsory process would seem 
Section 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (I970), which clearly applies to proceedings on the 
record (hence neither informal adjudication nor informal rulemaking), provides that the presid-
ing officer shall issue subpoenas authorized by Jaw, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (I970), and take 
depositions, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (I970). There can be no doubt that this section applies only to 
formal adjudication and rulemaking. 
I I6. Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of 
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 582. The Administrative Conference recommended 
that the APA be amended t_o authorize explicitly agency subpoena power and guarantee the 
right to compulsory process, but only in proceedings covered by sections 7 and 8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
· 556-57 (I970). Discovery in Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 70-4), supra note 9, at 
46-47. See ';['omlinson 142 (expanding the recommendation to adjudications which are within the 
spirit if not the letter of these provisions). An ABA resolution would have extended subpoena 
power to informal as well as formal adjudication. The 12 ABA Recommendations for Improved 
Procedures for Federal Agencies, 24 Ao. L. REV. 389, 408 (I972). 
117. See FfC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 99-IOI (D.C. Cir. 1970) (FfC subpoena can have 
nationwide service); FMC v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464,468-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 
(I966) (administrative service may extend beyond the U.S.). 
liS. Cf. Papercraft Corp. v. FfC, 472 F.2d 927, 929 (7th Cir. I973) (upholding FfC refusal 
to issue subpoenas duces tecum to 550 companies where there were other methods of develop-
ing the data). 
119. The legislative history of the FfC Improvement Act suggests the availability of subpoe-
na in that hybrid rulemaking procedure. The FfC effectuated this suggestion in its procedural 
rules. I6 C.F.R. § 1.13(d)(6) (1977). 
One court has held that an agency may not provide for compulsory process without 
statutory authorization. FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964). 
This opinion has been severely criticized, Galland, A Note on Maritime Discovery, 19 Ao. L. 
REV. 119 (1966), and is probably not good Jaw. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (I965). 
120. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See 
generally Note, Procedural Due Process After Goss v. Lopez, I976 DUKE L.J .. 409. 
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to be a necessary complement to this right. 121 
Even though compulsory process is necessary to effective participatory 
rights and can enhance the rulemaking record by increasing the availability 
of information, compulsory process should only be required where its 
detrimental effects can be mitigated. 122 Some measure of control is provided 
by the APA which, unlike the Federal Rules, 123 authorizes agencies to 
require a showing of reasonable scope and relevance prior to the issuance of 
a subpoena. 124 This general standard, however, does not seem sufficient in 
the context of rulemaking. Because of the number and variety of partici-
pants, some subpoenas which are both clearly relevant and limited in scope 
should not be issued. 'Pie availability of subpoenas must be substantially 
narrower. Agencies which do a considerable amount of rulemaking should 
articulate when compulsory process will be made available through restric-
tive guidelines which are carefully drafted in light of their particular 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, where there is to be compulsory process in rulemaking, it 
cannot be permitted without some initial screening. However, it may not be 
feasible to rely on the presiding officer to perform this function, since unlike 
Neither Goss nor Goldberg arose in the context of rulemaking, but both cases set forth 
certain basic requirements for due process in informal proceedings. In Connecticut State Dep't 
of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971), the state of Connecticut, which was 
challenging an informal action by the federal government, alleged that the HEW procedure was 
unfair because there was no provision for discovery by deposition or interrogatory and the 
hearing officer lacked the power to subpoena witnesses, papers and other evidence. Noting that 
the issues were not ones of adjudicative fact but questions of law, the Second Circuit cited 
Goldberg for the proposition that due process is not an unvarying standard but depends on the 
interests affected. Id. at 212. The court apparently believed that, since the aggrieved party (the 
state) had been given a hearing with the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, it could 
not show inadequacy of its right of confrontation, and hence it could not show, in this context, 
that its rights were prejudiced by the lack of subpoena power and discovery. Id. at 212-13. 
121. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 30, § 8.15 (citing cases on both sides of the proposition that 
discovery is a requisite element of fairness. The need for compulsory mechanisms would seem 
to vary with each individual informal process). 
122. The most significant detriments to compulsory process are harassment and delay. 
Friendly, supra note 12, at 1282-83. 
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 34. The elimination of a "good cause" requirement was a major change 
of the 1970 revision of the Federal Rules. RULES ADVISORY COMM. 487. 
124. APA § 6(d), 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970). See Tomlinson 128-29. Relevancy may also 
become an issue if an agency subpoena is resisted. Although the courts apply a very liberal 
notion of relevance, numerous cases have held that the agency subpoena must be relevant to an 
investigation. See, e.g., J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 234 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973) (one requesting subpoena must "state with sufficient 
particularity what value, if any, the files would have to it"); General Eng'r, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 
F.2d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1965) (one requesting a subpoena may be required to show relevance and 
reasonable scope). 
The ABA has proposed that administrative subpoenas be issued on request without a 
showing of relevance. The 12 ABA Recommendations for Improved Procedures for Federal 
Agencies, supra note 116, at 408. 
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adjudication, 125 rulemaking does not always include a clearly recognizable 
presiding officer who has control over the proceeding. Consequently, 
rulemaking agencies should delegate to an official the authority to issue 
subpoenas126 under the same sort of restrictive guidelines which would 
accompany delegation to a presiding officer.127 Agencies which use infor-
mal action, including informal rulemaking, to conduct business should 
designate an official to handle all compulsory process requested in connec-
tion with all informal proceedings and not spread this function among the 
various employees who are in charge of informal proceedings. Recognizing 
the special problems of informal. action, this official should have discretion 
to limit the availability of compulsory process even beyond the agency 
delegation guidelines whenever the benefits derived from a specific request 
would not outweigh the potential for oppression, harassment or delay. 
In summary, where the procedure is relatively formalized as in hybrid 
rulemaking, a presiding officer can control subpoena authority in much the 
same way as in an adjudicative hearing but under the restrictions prescribed 
by the delegation guidelines. For the great bulk of rulemaking, the absence 
of a clearly defined presiding employee will make the necessary control 
more difficult, and hence, the agency should appoint a special discovery 
official to handle all such requests under one set of guidelines. Whichever 
type of employee is utilized, the official should have discretion to limit 
compulsory process further than the restrictive guidelines but within certain 
general bounds. 
(b) Subpoena ad testificandum. Compelling the attendance of wit-
nesses in informal rulemaking raises substantial conceptual problems. While 
participants are offered or guaranteed the right to make an oral presentation 
with increasing frequency, there is no movement to compel persons to 
participate in rulemaking. The target of a rule has the right of confrontation 
only to the extent needed to rebut written or oral comments which have been 
voluntarily submitted. Although cross-examination is an important device in 
hybrid procedure, if a participant does not voluntarily appear to give oral 
testimony, he may avoid cross-examination. 
125. In formal adjudication, there will be an administrative law judge who will automatically 
exercise the agency's subpoena authority. See Tomlinson 141. 
126. Authority to issue subpoenas may be sub-delegated to agency employees. EEOC v. 
Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Gibson, 460 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 
1972); United States v. Marshall Durbin & Co., 363 F.2d I, 6-7 (5th Cir. 1966). The sub· 
delegation is usually confined by an investigative order, and the subpoenas issued by the lower 
level official must be within the scope of that order. SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166, 
169 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nemelka v. SEC, 404 U.S. 1038 (1971) (upholding the 
issue of a subpoena on the basis of a very broad investigative order). 
127. SeeK. DAVIS supra note 30, § 9.05-1 (1976) (sub-delegation should include administra-
tive standards); Hamilton 1175. 
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As a general proposition, it does not seem consistent with the concept 
of rulemaking to require persons to appear in order to be cross-examined. 
Nonetheless, there is a limited place in informal rulemaking for use of the 
subpoena ad testificandum. In order to assemble a complete record, it may 
be necessary in special cases to require such subpoenas for experts, especial-
ly where they may be the only source of certain relevant information. 
Interrogatories may ferret out most of this information, 128 but appearance of 
an expert may be required by fairness considerations. For example, fairness 
may compel the appearance of an expert who has been consulted by the 
agency when there is no other way to refute his findings or opinions. 
Subpoenas should also be available to compel testimony of persons other 
than experts who may have special knowledge of relevant facts, or persons 
such as employees, competitors, or those with other business relationships, 
who may be reluctant to come forward for fear of retaliation unless afforded 
the trappings of compulsion. Subpoena ad testificandum in rulemaking 
should nonetheless be reserved for very special circumstances. 
(c) Return of subpoena. The Administrative Conference study ex-
pressed particular concern for the practice of many agencies in providing for 
return of subpoena at the hearing, 129 thereby avoiding prehearing discovery. 
In a sense, this is not a problem in rulemaking because the record remains 
open for an extended period and does not close at the end of any oral 
proceeding. If, because of the absence of prehearing discovery, the partici-
pant cannot present his full position, the further presentation can always be 
added to the record. This process, however, is equivalent to the much 
criticized "hearing by interval. " 130 The goal in rulemaking, therefore, 
should be the return of subpoenas in time to permit rebuttal. 
Production of Documents and Tangible Things 
A participant in rulemaking may obtain documents either through 
discovery, which can operate on either the agency or a private person, or 
through a Freedom of Information Act request, which can operate only on 
the agency but which may result in access to private documents. A partici-
pant should first attempt to obtain access to documents through a traditional 
subpoena duces tecum, because this process will be directly related to the 
specific proceedings. Where a traditional subpoena duces tecum is not 
available, however, or where the desired documents are outside the scope of 
the agency's discovery provisions, an effective participant must understand 
128. The problem may be mitigated by some compulsion to answer written interrogatories. 
See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(d). 
129. See Tomlinson 127. 
130. See Rowe, The Role of Discovery in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, 21 AD. L. 
REv. 439 (1968-69); see also Tomlinson 128. 
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and use the Freedom of Information Act. Familiarity with the potential of 
that Act will greatly increase the fund of information available for use in 
rulemaking. 
(a) Agency process for discovery of documentary material. In 
rulemaking, there is often no testimonial procedure or only an abbreviated 
testimonial phase. A participant must therefore have an adequate means of 
obtaining documentary evidence in order to prepare for and to support an 
effective written presentation or oral argument. To the extent that such 
access to documentary evidence is limited, therefore, the argument for 
testimonial devices becomes much stronger. An agency's reticence to pro-
vide adequate discovery of relevant documents may work against its efforts 
to avoid the imposition of formal testimonial procedures. In addition, as 
discussed above, notions of fairness and the concept of equality of opportu-
nity articulated in section 6(d)131 of the APA compel the conclusion that 
some process must be provided to enable private participants to obtain 
materials which are necessary to represent their interests. 132 
The open admissibility of documentary "evidence" creates a unique 
problem. The adjudicative process contains various procedures for testing 
documentary evidence before it is admitted for use in the decision-making. 
In rulemaking, there is no such testing. Even in hybrid rulemaking, only 
those documents directly related to oral testimony may be tested by cross-
examination. Other documents, even where there are some trial procedures, 
will enter the record with no screening. Since it would be contrary to the 
whole notion of informal rulemaking to reject documentary evidence which 
has not gone through the screening processes used in adjudication, a 
rulemaking record will necessarily be full of documentary material of 
indeterminate value. Yet rulemaking is primarily concerned with argument 
over policy, and the only purpose served by trial procedures in rulemaking is 
to permit the introduction of oral proof into the record; the procedures are 
not intended to create trial-type thresholds for the admissibility of evidence. 
Therefore, the agencies will inevitably have a great deal of discretion in 
determining the authenticity and competence of documents, the inferences 
which can be drawn from the written material presented, and the weight to 
be given documents. One limitation on this discretion would be a require-
ment that the agency carefully explain the value placed on significant, 
untested documentary evidence in its "statement of basis and purpose. " 133 
Another potential control is participant questions of the competence 
and value of a document. However, the ability of the participants to 
131. 5 u.s.c. § 555(d) (1970). 
132. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text. 
133. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); Pedersen, supra note 24, at 7C). 
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challenge or bolster documentary evidence may depend on their ability to 
find information relative to the subject of the document. Written inter-
rogatories provide one method for uncovering further information, but it 
would also serve this purpose if the agency assisted participants in obtaining 
further documentary material. Because written submissions are so important 
to informal rulemaking, the discovery of documents should be preferred 
over other forms of discovery, particularly where the documents are sought 
to support a response to other participants' documentary submissions. 
An interesting question is whether documentary requests aimed at 
non-participants should be treated differently from requests to participants, 
especially dominant participants. The Administrative Conference recom-
mendation for formal proceedings distinguishes parties from non-parties, 
making access to party documents more difficult to obtain than access to 
non-party documents. 134 As previously noted, the party/fion-party distinc-
tion breaks down in rulemaking. 135 Even though some persons are clearly 
more interested than others, a distinction between parties and non-parties, or 
interested and not-so-interested persons, serves no purpose. If any such 
distinction is to be made, it should be done only to facilitate documentary 
requests to participants and to restrict closely requests to non-participants. 
On the whole, a subpoena duces tecum should be available to elicit 
documentary material from any person, and should be issued to any poten-
tial participant who demonstrates that the subpoena will produce valuable 
information. The scope of the right to subpoenas duces tecum should not be 
limited according to who is asking for the information or from whom the 
information would be obtained: the key issue is whether the subpoena will 
be likely to produce information valuable to the rulemaking process. Indeed, 
a petition demonstrating a valuable line of inquiry should lead the agency 
staff to follow that line on its own. Rulemaking is, after all, investigative 
and not adversarial. The agency should actively pursue any source of 
information, and it should delegate to its staff authority to determine the 
value of lines of inquiry suggested by an interested person. The agency's 
more active role, however, should be in lieu of th~ ready availability of 
subpoena duces tecum. Such subpoenas should be issued to a private 
participant in rulemaking under fairly limited circumstances. 
As suggested above, a special staff person should have control of such 
subpoena power for all informal rulemaking. 136 This official should be 
delegated discretion, under careful guidelines, to limit the availability of 
134. Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of 
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 643-45. This divergent treatment is based on the need 
for the presid~ng officer to exercise control pver interparty discovery and on the fact that such 
discovery is likely to be quantitatively greater than that between parties and non-parties. See 
Tomlinson 131-32. 
135. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra. 
136. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra. 
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subpoenas duces tecum more narrowly than the statutory bounds of relevan-
cy and reasonable scope. The agency should provide some mechanism for 
reviewing any failure to issue a private subpoena and for challenging any 
subpoena so issued. Because of the special utility of documentary material 
in rulemaking, a subpoena duces tecum should be more readily available 
than a subpoena ad testificandum and refusal should be more carefully 
considered. Judicial review, however, must await the final rule, as in the 
case of other nonconstitutional procedural denials. 137 
Under the Administrative Conference's recommendation for adjudica-
tions, when a party applies for production of documents, the burden shifts to 
the person from whom the documents are requested. In other words, the 
burden of persuasion is placed on the party opposing the production of 
documents. 138 The scope of informal rulemaking, however, generally dic-
tates against free-wheeling requests for documents from private individuals. 
Rather, the initial burden in rulemaking should be on the applicant to 
demonstrate, in addition to relevancy and reasonable scope, the need for the 
documents and the substantial benefit they will confer on the rulemaking 
process. The production of documents is always a burden. Corporations are 
already straining under the information demands of the government, and 
even a limited request for documents will be burdensome to most private 
individuals. Thus, before the government acquiesces in any increase in this 
burden, an applicant should be required to overcome a threshold showing of 
need and potential benefit. The requesting participant should also be re-
quired to show that the agency rulemaking staff has not or will not pursue a 
source of important, relevant documentary material. This last requirement 
will, of course, substantially raise the threshold because it can be presumed 
that the staff will attempt to secure any useful documentary information to 
which it is alerted. 
(b) Discovery of agency documents. While strict limitations on the 
right to obtain documents from private individuals are imperative to prevent 
oppression, harassment and delay, the right to obtain information from the 
rulemaking agency need not be so confined. Two possibilities exist for 
tapping this source: discovery and the Freedom of Information Act. 
An agency's procedures for allowing discovery of documents in its 
possession should permit at least the level of access to such documents 
afforded in judicial proceedings. Traditionally, discovery of agency docu-
137. Interlocutory appeal of an agency decision with regard to discovery is not generally 
permitted. E.g., FfC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v. 
FfC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1394 (5th Cir. 1971); Maremont Corp. v. FfC, 431 F.2d 124, 127-28 (7th 
Cir. 1970); cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. FfC, 38 Ao. L.2o 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pre-enforcement 
review of subpoena denied). 
138. Tomlinson 121. 
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ments under the Federal Rules139 has been limited by only two privileges: 
the "state secret" privilege140 and the official documents privilege. 141The 
state secret privilege is limited to military or diplomatic secrets. 142 Ordinari-
ly, rulemaking will not involve national secrets; 143 hence allowing the 
agencies broad discretion to deny access to such documents will rarely result 
in detrimental withholding. It is also probable that agencies with sensitive 
documents will not release them to other agencies. As a result, non-military 
and non-diplomatic agencies whose rules may affect these areas will not 
possess truly "secret" information in most cases. 
Thus, only the official document privilege will be likely to impose 
substantial limitations on discovery of agency documents in rule making. 
Where the privilege is provided for by statute, 144 no serious definitional 
problems will be presented. On the other hand, the scope of the judge-made 
privilege is not clear and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 145 The 
theory behind the case-by-case determination is one of balancing. Courts 
have differed, however, on which interest should be balanced. 146 
Generally, the courts have balanced the discoverant's need for the 
information against the agency's need to protect the document. An agency 
conducting an administrative proceeding would be justified in making a 
similar determination before disclosing any of its own documents which 
might be privileged. Striking this balance, or delegating to an employee the 
authority to strike this balance, will be preferable to a stonewall refusal to 
release a certain official document. However, the "public interest" should 
also be considered in the formula, 147 and in rulemaking the public interest is 
strongly in favor of disclosure of any government documents which a 
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 34. 
140. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1953); Zagel, The State Secrets 
Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706, 
710-11 (1974). 
141. See generally 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE~~ 26.61[1]-[6.1], [7] (2d ed. 1975); 2 J. 
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 60, ~~ 509[05]-[10]; Berger, How the Privilege for 
Governmental Information Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 747 (1975); Bishop, 
The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 
(1962). 
142. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 60, ~~ 509[02]-[04]. 
143. Many agencies make rules affecting foreign affairs or national defense and rulemaking 
directly involving these subjects may be exempt from notice and comment procedures. APA §4 
(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970). See Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making 
Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 222 (1972). 
144. See Comment, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information 
Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 149-56 (1976). 
145. See Tomlinson 136. 
146. See Comment, supra note 144, at 143-45. 
147. See id. at 143. See also FED. R. Evm. 509(a)(2) ("Official information ..• the 
disclosure of which is contrary to the public interest . . . "). 
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participant in the proceeding feels may lead to a more complete record. 
Agencies should, therefore, be hesitant to withhold any information from a 
rulemaking participant on the grounds of the official information privilege. 
(c) The Freedom of Information Act as a discovery tool. The enact-
ment of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reflected Congress' deter-
mination that widespread disclosure of government information is in the 
public interest. 148 Indeed, if a rulemaking participant desires information 
contained in a government file, the FOIA may be the best available discov-
ery tooi.l49 Access to agency documents through the Act need not be in 
conjunction with a particular proceeding, therefore an attempt to secure 
documents may begin immediately after an interested person receives any 
hint that a rulemaking is being considered. The time limits under the new 
amendments to the FOIA should permit prompt access to agency files. 150 
The FOIA provides de facto prehearing discovery since the agency 
cannot limit access to information in its files to return at hearing. The 
judicial opinions enforcing the Act evidence a much greater inclination to 
open up the files of agencies than do judicial interpretations of the ordinary 
discovery provisions. On the other hand, while the use of the FOIA for 
discovery purposes has not been proscribed, some courts have taken a dim 
view of efforts to use the Act as a substitute for Federal Rule 26. 151 
Nonetheless, in agency proceedings where discovery is limited, as in most 
rulemaking, the FOIA may fill an important void. 152 
148. See S. Doc. No. 93-82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1974). 
149. The FOIA does not require creation of material il) government files. A request which 
requires compiling information may be refused, and hence the Act will not serve the same 
function as interrogatories or the like. 
150. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)" (Supp. 1976) (requiring agency response within 10 
days to any person requesting information under the Act). But cf. Open American v. Watergate 
Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (permitting FBI to exceed time limits 
where compliance efforts were shown to have been made with "due diligence" and in "good 
faith"). 
151. See, e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); 
National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lincoln National 
Bank v. Lampe, 45 U.S.L.W. 2195 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1976) Verrazzano Trading Corp. v. 
United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (Cust. Ct. 1972). But seeK. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 63 
(contending that FOIA was intended to benefit party in an agency proceeding as well as to 
compel disclosure to the electorate); Comment, Taxpayers Discovery in Civil Federal Tax 
Controversies, 51 NEB. L. REV. 290, 294 (1971). 
The FfC attempted to separate the FOIA from discovery by channeling discovery through 
administrative Jaw judges (in accordance with traditional procedures) and FOIA requests 
through agency-wide FOIA processes. See J.J. Newberry Co., 30 Ao. L.2o 816 (FfC 1972); 
Hearst Corp., 30 Ao. L.2o 92 (FfC 1971). A similar approach is suggested in Hamilton at 1175. 
152. See Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
rev'd, 415 U.S. I (1974) (staying an agency proceeding until information was released under the 
FOIA, apparently because the renegotiation process did not include the availability of 
discovery). 
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It is important to emphasize that the FOIA does not permit the agency 
to distinguish between requesting parties; it requires disclosure to "any 
person. " 153 One implication of this terminology is that access is available 
without any demonstration of need. Thus, from an interested person's point 
of view, the Act is the perfect discovery device: the agency cannot limit 
access to information by requiring a showing of need, reasonable scope or 
relevancy to a proceeding. 154 Secondly, the Act's language implies that any 
number of interested persons may seek such unlimited "discovery." Al-
though the broad scope of the Act enhances its utility from a private 
interest's point of view, its breadth is a mixed blessing in terms of the 
general public interest. While Congress clearly found that the public was 
best served by burdening the public treasury with the considerable expense 
of providing broad disclosure of information and ordained that disclosure 
take precedence over the agencies' ability to perform their primary func-
tions, a paramount public interest still dictates that information requests not 
be permitted to interfere with or interrupt the rulemaking process. The FOIA 
may arm those who are adversely affected by a proposed regulation with a 
technique for frustrating the rulemaking effort by preventing a rulemaking 
agency from closing the record or issuing a rule pending disclosure of great 
quantities of information no matter how important or relevant. 
In situations not involving rulemaking, there has been substantial 
controversy· over whether courts can stay agency proceedings until final 
determination with respect to an FOIA request. Although the Supreme Court 
refused to stay proceedings in the only context in which this question has 
been presented to it, it refused to eliminate the possibility that it might do so 
in other settings. 155 Despite the statutory effort to speed compliance by the 
imposition of strict time limits within which an agency must act on a 
request,156 any documents which the agency wishes to protect and which are 
arguably exempt from disclosure may be released only after a court proceed-
ing. An FOIA case may take considerable time and thus the danger remains 
of a de facto denial of access to information necessary for meaningful 
participation in rulemaking. But rulemaking involves a broad public inter-
est, and a court should be reluctant to bridle that interest for the purpose of a 
153. 5 U.S.C. § 551(a)(3) (1970). 
154. The Act is probably an overreaction to the agencies' use of "good cause" and similar 
language in the old public information provision of the APA to shut out virtually all public 
scrutiny. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); Davis, The Information Act: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765-66 (1967) (criticizing broad access without 
requiring a reason). 
155. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1974); accord, 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975); General Cigar Co. v. 
Nash, 36 Ao. L.2o '1073 (D.D.C. 1975); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 37 Ao. L.2o 685 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
156. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. 
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single Information Act request. This is especially true since an interested 
person who receives new information can always petition for modification 
of a final rule under section 4(d) of the APA.157 The present posture of the 
courts, therefore, is probably correct: stays should be considered, but only 
reluctantly granted. 
Nine exemptions limit access to information under the FOIA and 
specifically define the information which the agency may withhold. 158 Thus 
the structure of the Act is to grant total access and then withdraw, through 
the exemptions, specific categories of documents. The agencies may with-
hold information only by overcoming the presumption in favor of disclosure 
through a demonstration that one of the exemptions applies. Two exemp-
tions in particular serve to protect the kind of government information 
frequently desired by rulemaking participants: exemption 5, the interagency 
and intra-agency information exemption, and exemption 7, the exemption 
for investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. A brief 
discussion of these two exemptions in the rulemaking context may be 
helpful. 
The internal documents exemption is the one most closely related to 
traditional discovery doctrines. 159 Interpretation of this exemption has been 
based on the notion that discovery of the mental processes of agency 
personnel should not be permitted. This interpretation is supported by the 
157. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) {1970). 
158. 5 U.S.C. f552(b) (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), 
provides that the Act does not require disclosure of matters that are: 
(I) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact 
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 
(3) specifically exempted from <fisclosure by statute; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person 
and privileged or confidential; 
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be avail-
able by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; 
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the 
extent that the production of such records would {A) interfere with enforcement 
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, 
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, {D) disclose the identity 
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law 
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency 
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential informa-
tion furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques 
and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement 
personnel; 
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared 
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or 
supervision of financial institutions; or 
{9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning 
wells. 
159. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148-53 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 
u.s. 73, 85-86 (1973). 
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FOIA's legislative history, which clearly indicates that the exemption was 
intended to prevent the agencies from operating in a "fishbowl. " 160 This 
exemption protects the opinion portions of agency documents, 161 and hence, 
the overall effect is to render the FOIA useless as a means of uncovering the 
reasons behind a proposed rule. 162 
The other important exemption, the investigatory files exemption, may 
not apply to rulemaking files. As amended in 1974, this exemption applies 
only to "investigative records compiled for law enforcement purposes. " 163 
Clearly, rulemaking has law enforcement goals and, as such, any investiga-
tion conducted for the purpose of promulgating a rule would appear to be 
within the language of the exemption. Records compiled for rulemaking 
may be considered law enforcement because the law-defining process of 
rulemaking is essentially prophylactic;164 that is, its function is to define the 
law so as to prevent violations. 165 Nevertheless, the Attorney General 
specifically stated that "[r]ecords generated for such purposes as determin-
ing the need for new regulations . . . '' are not compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes.166 This conclusion is supported by a statement made by the 
sponsor of the 1974 amendment to this exemption, Senator Hart, who 
suggested that the exemption was intended to cover only judicial-type law 
enforcement proceedings which focused on specific violations. 167 Further 
support for limiting the exemption to proceedings involving actual viola-
tions is found in the few FOIA cases which have tried to define the extent of 
the term "law enforcement. " 168 
160. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 154, at 9. 
161. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-89 (1973). 
162. However, opinion-type documents which are "secret law" must be disclosed. For 
example, an interpretation of a regulation or an internal directive modifying a regulation would 
have to be released. See Davis, supra note 148, at 797. Also, the thinking of the agency should 
be disclosed in the notice of proposed rule making. See text accompanying note 203-05 infra. 
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1974). In its original form, the exemption applied to 
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by 
law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). 
164. See National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
165. Support for this notion is found in the Attorney General's memo on the 1974 amend-
ments to the FOIA in which it is suggested that the scope of "'[l]aw enforcement' includes not 
merely the detection and punishment of law violation, but also its prevention." ATIORNEY 
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 6. 
166. Id. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE 
L.J. 416, 450-51. 
167. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 Sourcebook: Legislative History, 
Texts, and Other Documents, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 333 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) (the 
exemption would apply to "a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding"). 
168. "[W]here the inquiry departs from the routine and focuses with special intensity upon a 
particular party, an investigation is under way." Center for National Policy Review v. Wein-
berger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 
73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (distinguishing between files relating to "surveillance or oversight" and 
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The 1974 amendment of the exemption which changed "files" to 
''records'' also suggests an intention to protect only specific law enforce-
ment materials. 169 To understand the full impact of what appears to be a 
mere semantic amendment, one must recognize the perceived trend in the 
development of the law just prior to 1974. In a major shift in perspective, 
the District of Columbia Circuit began deciding cases involving the exemp-
tion in such a way as to imply a blanket exemption for all files compiled in 
law enforcement proceedings. 170 The drafters of the 1974 amendment 
thought that the term "records" would focus the exemption more narrowly 
on only the investigative portions of agency files and not on entire files 
compiled in furtherance of investigations. It is difficult to conceive of any 
portion of a rulemaking file which would take on the aspects of specific law 
enforcement material. Again, the exemption makes sense only in terms of 
the specific focus of an investigation on an individual; an investigative 
"record" implies information related to a particularized quasi-judicial in-
quiry, not a quasi-legislative record. All of the above is reasonable with 
respect to subsection (A) of exemption (7), but the other subsections, (B-F), 
have their own justifications which raise questions as to their applicability in 
rulemaking. For example, there may be good reason why an informer's 
identity should be protected, even in rulemaking. Perhaps the specific 
subsections of the exemption, other than subsection (A), should be treated 
as expressing specific purposes which have independent significance in 
addition to the general prevention of interference with agency law enforce-
ment and, hence, should be applied where these specific purposes can be 
demonstrated. Such an approach conflicts with the clear language of the 
Act, however, for the phrase "investigative records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes'' applies to all the parts of the exemption. Indeed, the 
specific provisions of the exemption appear to be intended to limit further 
"investigations which focus directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular 
identified officials, acts which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions"). Although 
these two cases were decided prior to the effective date of the amendment, the above interpre-
tations seem consistent with the thrust of the 1974 changes and hence continue in force with 
respect to this issue). 
169. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 5-6. 
170. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlaw v. 
Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Aspin v. Laird, 491 F.2d 
24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
The trend began with Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), a case that was distinguishable because it involved a criminal 
i11vestigatory file. Criminal files should be treated separately and given far more protection than 
civil investigatory files in order to prevent disruption of criminal law enforcement and protect 
those under criminal investigation. It is possible that the District of Columbia Circuit, with its 
reputation for strict interpretation of the FOIA exemptions, merely appeared to apply this 
exemption more broadly because the agencies were presenting specific factual situations which 
justified a broad reading of the exemption. 
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the scope of the introductory phrase and not to provide individual excuses 
for withholding information. On balance, weighing the pro-disclosure bias 
of the Act, it seems more consistent with the original congressional intent, 
as well as the congressional intent in amending the Act, to consider 
rulemaking files outside the exemption altogether. 
(d) Government files as a source of private information. In discus-
sing the use of discovery techniques and the FOIA to gain access to agency 
files, it is important to note that these files may also be a prime source of 
private information. 171 An astute participant in a rulemaking proceeding 
should therefore consider the possibility of seeking access to government 
files before deciding that a desired private document is unavailable. 
The Administrative Conference recommended that non-privileged pri-
vate information in the hands of the government be discoverable by parties 
to an agency adjudication, regardless of whether the information was trans-
mitted to the agency in confidence. 172 This proposal would appear to have 
equal validity in rulemaking. 
The FOIA may also offer access to the fund of private information in 
government files. Two major exemptions, the fourth and the sixth, 173 may 
protect this private information, but both have been given very limited scope 
by the courts. 174 In addition, it is uncertain whether an agency is obliged to 
assert an available exemption. 175 Even if such action were required by law176 
171. See Gellhorn 126-29. 
172. Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of 
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 654-55. The conference seemed concerned only with 
the effect public disclosure might have on the agency. The report evidences no concern for 
individual privacy as such. Id. at 655-56 (referring to the potential applicability of FOIA 
exemption (4), protecting commercial or financial information, rather than exemption (6), 
personal privacy). 
173. The text of the exemptions is quoted in note 158 supra. 
174. Judicial construction of these exemptions conforms with the apparent lack of respect 
the drafters of the FOIA had for the right of privacy. The sole exemption which covers 
individual privacy is triggered only when the invasion is "clearly unwarranted"; disclosure 
which constitutes an arguably justifiable invasion of privacy is compelled by the Act. See 
Davis, supra note 154, at 783; Miiier, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a 
New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1194 (1969). In 
applying this exemption, the courts have balanced the right to privacy against the need for 
disclosure, giving greater weight to the latter consideration. See Department of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378-82 (1976); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It 
would seem that the right to privacy demands better treatment. Indeed, in the context of 
judicial discovery, federal courts have recognized that interests in privacy may call for a 
measure of extra protection. See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 497. 
175. For a discussion of this question, see Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-
The Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DuKE L. J. 330. Several private parties who have supplied 
information to the government have sought to prevent disclosure of the information in response 
to FOIA requests. Id. at 331-32. 
It would appear to be a misuse of public funds for the government to defend these "reverse 
FOIA" cases. The plaintiff has the burden of making a prima facie case, and if a party can carry 
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or if a common law privilege were created for private documents, 177 the 
protection afforded would be of limited value since the affected private 
person would often not receive notice that his privacy had been jeopardized 
by a request or intention to release. 178 Clearly, the absence of adequate 
protection for those who submit private information to the government is the 
one area where lack of diligence by the drafters of the FOIA has done the 
most damage. Nonetheless, for one seeking information, it is a ready avenue 
and should not be ignored in preparing for rulemaking. 179 
this burden, there is no justification for the government's wasting public funds in an attempt to 
rebut an individual's right to protect information which is arguably confidential. 
176. There has been some suggestion that the fourth exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) 
(1970), prohibits disclosure of confidential private information. See Westinghouse Elec. v. 
Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974); see also GTE Sylvania v. Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352 (D. Del. 1975); Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 
633 (E.D. Va. 1975). But the burden is on the one seeking to prevent disclosure. Chrysler Corp. 
v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1976); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 402 F. Supp. 
378 (D.D.C. 1975); Hughes Aircraft v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The state 
of confusion is demonstrated by two recent Fifth Circuit cases. The first, Continental Oil v. 
FPC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub. nom Superior Oil v. FPC, 96 S. Ct. 2168 
(1976), appears to have held that exemption (4) is mandatory. The second, Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 
534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976), concluded that the FOIA did not prevent disclosure. Cf. LaMorte 
v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971) (the exemption belongs to the agency, not to private 
individuals). 
177. For example, such a privilege could be developed through judicial review of agency 
decisions to release private information in order to determine whether the action was an abuse 
of discretion. See Note, supra note 175, at 344-47. 
Whether a private right of action can be implied under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) (making 
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential information by a government employee a 
criminal offense) is a matter of some dispute. For example, in Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. 
HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court originally held that it could imply such a right, 
but subsequently changed its mind. 
178. Although one court has refused to imply a right to notice prior to disclosure of private 
information in the hands of an agency, Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp •. 
444, 448 (D.D.C. 1975), a few agencies have provided for a limited right to notice by regulation. 
See 32 C.F.R. § 1285.7(b)(7) (1976) (Defense Supply Agency required to give notice whenever 
"there is reason to believe that the source of the information . . . may object to release and 
may have an enforceable right to prevent release .... "); 21 C.F.R. §§4.45·46 (FDA required 
to give prior notice where confidentiality is close or "uncertain"). These notice procedures 
have been found to conform to due process requirements. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 
412 F. Supp. 171, 178 (D. Del. 1976) (Defense Supply Agency); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D.D.C. 1976) (FDA). 
One means of providing some protection for private persons would be to require rulemak-
ing participants to attempt to obtain the information from the private person himself prior to 
seeking access to the agency files. See, e.g., FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 
3.36(b) (1977). Such an approach was rejected by the Administrative Conference in developing 
its recommendations for agency adjudication. Tomlinson 139. 
179. Some agencies, such as the FTC, require a showing that the private information was 
not available through voluntary means. Such requirements have been criticized. Bennett, 
Post-Complaint Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: The FTC As a Case Study, 1975 
DUKE L. J. 329. 
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(e) Discovery or FOIA requests for Exhibits. It should be possible for 
interested persons to obtain exhibits and other "tangible things" to the same 
extent as documents. 180 Many agency discovery statutes authorize sub-
poenas only for "documentary evidence, " 181 but the realities are that 
discovery has been made applicable, as recommended by the Administrative 
Conference, to "documents and tangible things." 182 
An interesting question is whether the FOIA provides access to exhibits 
and tangible things. The Act refers to "records," 183 and one early case held 
that this did not include exhibits. 184 However, there is no practical reason to 
distinguish documents from other tangible things; therefore, tangible things 
should be made available to the same extent as documents despite the 
semantic argument that they are not "records." 185 . 
Protective Orders and Other Protections for Private Information 
Concomitant with the availability of discovery in rulemaking is the 
need to protect sensitive private and government information through pro-
tective orders, assurances of confidentiality, devices in the nature of in 
camera inspection, and other measures. 186 It is clear that, where rulemaking 
procedure provides for discovery, protective devices should be available. 187 
The context of rulemaking does not affect the validity of this general 
proposition; however, the amorphous character of informal rulemaking does 
create some difficulties in providing protective devices. One problem is 
determining who should have authority to grant protective orders. In adjudi-
cation, the administrative law judge can perform this function, 188 but, 
180. Tomlinson 126. 
181. See, e.g., FrC Act§ 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1970). 
182. See Tomlinson 126. 
183. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). 
184. Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 135-37 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd on other 
grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972) (denying access to exhibits 
relating to President Kennedy's assassination). See Note, supra note 23, at 904 n.55. 
185. In Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973), the court interpreted literally the 
terms "memorandums or letters" -in FOIA exemption (5). It found that the exemption did not 
include films, and therefore ordered that internal government films be disclosed. Id. at 704. See 
Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366, 391. 
Consquently, exhibits and tangible things may ·be more available since they could never be 
subject to the internal document exemption under the Stokes rationale. 
186. Judge Weinstein lists six measures which should be considered. 2 J.WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, supra note 60, 11 508(3). The Administrative Conference lists various protections. 
Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency-Adjudication, supra note 9, at 42. 
187. See FrC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1260-61 (D.D.C. 
1969); Tomlinson 140-41. Cf. FrC v. Crowther, 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (questioning the 
agency's refusal to provide same protection for business information given in similar previous 
case). 
188. See Gellhorn 182. The presiding officer can also perform· this function in formal 
rulemaking. See Hamilton 1175. 
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generally speaking, there is no independent presiding officer in rulemaking. 
The agency could delegate authority to the discovery official suggested 
above; 189 however, the power to create non-public files in rulemaking 
should be closely circumscribed. 190 If the agency delegates this authority to 
a presiding officer or a special discovery officer, it must do so with very 
restrictive standards. 191 Rulemaking differs from adjudication in that public 
participation is essential to its functioning. Anything which closes the 
process or excludes the public detracts from its efficacy. Thus, only in the 
most extreme case should information be shielded from the public. Caution 
might, in fact, require that the power to apply protective devices should 
remain in the agency head. Whether the agency head retains the authority or 
delegates it, great care should be taken to limit the use of protective devices 
in rulemaking. 
Another major problem is the effect of agency protective orders on 
information sought under the Freedom of Information Act. The general rule 
developed by the courts is that assurances of confidentiality-informal pro-
tective orders-do not necessarily protect documents submitted to the agen-
cy even when submitted in reliance on the assurance. 192 The only effect of 
such orders, it appears, is to commit the agency to claim an exemption for 
the document and to attempt to protect the documents from judicial 
release. 193 
Roles of the Presiding Officer and the Agency Staff in Discovery 
(a) The presiding officer. The Administrative Conference recom-
mendation for agency adjudication relies throughout on a strong presiding 
officer, and it would delegate to him broad discovery authority, free from 
interlocutory appeal except by certification. 194 The difficulty with applying 
this recommendation to rulemaking is, once again, the amorphorous nature 
of the rulemaking procedure, and particularly the uncertain functions of the 
presiding officer. 
There has been little study of the role of a presiding officer in rulemak-
ing. If the proceeding is totally written, there might be no presiding officer, 
189. See text accompanying notes 126-27, supra. 
190. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 97 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977) (requiring 
that information be disclosed for comment "at some time"). 
191. See Gellhorn, supra note 61, at 422-23 (arguing that the agency should set standards for 
presiding officers' decisions regarding sensitive private information). 
192. See Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 
843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973). Assurances of confidentiality will protect personal documents from 
disclosure under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(k)(2), (5), (7) (1970), but it has been 
suggested that they be sparingly granted. Privacy Act Implementation: Guidelines and Respon-
sibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,973 (1975). 
193. See note 175 supra and accompanying text. 
194. Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, supra note 9, at 242. 
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or only a designated agency employee with whom comment should be filed. 
Where there is only an oral argument-style hearing, the presiding officer 
may be part of a special staff employed to hear rulemaking proceedings, or 
simply any designated member of the agency investigative staff. The major 
hybrid rulemaking cases195 clearly envision a somewhat judge-like presiding 
officer. With respect to their ability to control the proceeding, these officers 
function like a judge. In a hybrid proceeding, such control is exceedingly 
important to integration of the testimonial devices with the informal process. 
In informal rulemaking, however, the judicial model is inappropriate. 
The presiding officer must remain a functioning party in the information 
gathering process. Rulemaking is essentially an investigative process which 
seeks facts and opinions related to questions of policy. A presiding officer in 
rulemaking must cooperate with the investigative staff to insure that the 
rulemaking record contains as much useful information as possible. In order 
to promote the maximum utilization of the available expertise on the sub-
ject, the presiding officer should work closely with the staff in formulating 
the proposed rule and any recommendation to the ultimate decision-maker. 
Thus, the notion of separation of function is inconsistent with the concept of 
rulemaking and with the most effective use of the process. 196 In sum, the 
presiding officer should not sit back passively but· should aggressively 
attempt to develop the record through an informed handling of the proceed-
ing. 197 Where the presiding officer is committed to developing a complete 
record, formal discovery may be less important because he may be relied 
upon to explore, or to direct the staff to explore, avenues of information 
suggested by an interested person. 
Where a presiding officer for rulemaking is established by the agency 
procedure, the Administrative Conference recommendation should be incor-
porated. The near absolute control proposed by the Conference is a practical 
necessity; indeed, the breadth of rulemaking supports even more control 
over discovery by the presiding officer than in adjudication. Interlocutory 
195. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
196. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Keindienst, 478 F.2d 1, 13 (3d Cir. 1973); see also 
Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer-Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 899, 922 (1973). On the other hand, two views of the record, that of the presiding officer 
and that of the investigative staff would be valuable to the ultimate decision-maker and to a 
reviewing court. Intramural bias could be checked by opening these two recommendations to 
public criticism before submission to the agency head for decision. 
197. The Anglo-American concept of a passive judge has been criticized even in the 
traditional judicial setting. See Frankel, TheSearchforTruth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1031 (1975). Clearly the presiding officer in rulemaking should be knowledgeable and well 
prepared, and he should bear the greatest responsibility for a complete record. 
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appeal should be prohibited and certification should be discouraged. Cer-
tainly stays should not be issued pending interlocutory appeals. 198 
Where there is no presiding officer who can readily control discovery, 
some other method must be found, for any means of providing discovery 
still requires substantial control over its use. A member of the agency's 
investigative staff might be empowered to make unreviewable decisions as 
to private discovery. As suggested above, 199 perhaps each agency which 
makes substantial use of informal procedures should designate a permanent 
discovery officer who will handle all discovery requests made in conjunc-
tion with any informal proceeding. One advantage of this special office 
would be its independence from the rulemaking staff. This independence 
would enable the officer to make a disinterested determination of the likely 
value of a proposed avenue of inquiry. Furthermore, under this system, 
discovery might be available before the actual rulemaking process is under-
way, and would not have to await the appointment of a presiding official. 
This benefit would be of particular significance in informal rulemaking, 
where it is often difficult to tell exactly when the rulemaking begins. Of 
course, where there is no actual proposed rule, the burden of demonstrating 
the need for discovery will be severe. Yet there may frequently be situations 
when a rule is proposed well before the determination is made to have an 
oral proceeding or to appoint a presiding officer of some sort. Similarly, 
where there will be no oral proceeding or presiding officer, this permanent 
discovery officer may be the only mechanism aside from direct request to 
the agency by which discovery can be made available. 
(b) The agency staff. The agency staff should not be seen as advo-
cates but as investigators actively developing a record without regard to the 
implications of the information uncovered. 200 A major problem arises when 
the agency staff itself feels compelled to "prove the rule." It is, of course, 
human nature for the development staff to become advocates of the initial 
rule.201 However, staff members should be encouraged to avoid this self-
image. Discovery should serve to check this potential advocacy and to 
198. Harm from the failure to provide timely discovery is less likely to result in rulemaking 
because there is no absolute time by which information must enter the record. Information of 
any significance can always be accepted until the final process of molding the rule has begun. 
Indeed, even after the rule is issued, important information may be submitted to the agency 
with a petition for amendment or repeal. APA § 4(d), 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
199. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra. 
200. See Gellhorn 177 (FfC should disclose all reports prepared by experts); Verkuil, supra 
note 112, at 224 (agencies should not be permitted to exclude from the rulemaking record 
evidence adverse to their position). See also Bonfield, Representation for the Poor In Federal 
Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REv. 511, 524 (1969) (agency should take affirmative steps to obtain 
information for any point of view which it cannot reasonably expect the interest group to 
adequately protect). · 
201. See Pedersen, supra note 24, at 56. 
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assure that the staff does not unconsciously avoid finding some information. 
The need for discovery and other procedural safeguards, therefore, is great-
est when the staff of an agency demonstrates that it perceives itself in an 
advocate's rather than an investigator's role.202 
Requiring Disclosure to Complement Discovery 
While the extent of a right to discovery in informal rulemaking is 
unclear, many of the devices of discovery should be provided simply 
because they enhance the ~fficacy of the information gathering process and 
because adequate sources of information are essential to effective participa-
tion. But the entire problem may be approached from a different angle: 
information should be gathered and disclosed by the agency as a necessary 
element of the notice required by the AP A and the fundamental notions of 
fairness underlying the rulemaking process.203 Certainly, the concept of 
adequate notice should include a requirement that the agency disclose, to the 
greatest extent possible, what it intends to do, and may suggest that a 
preliminary statement of basis and purpose accompany a proposed rule.204 
However, not only should the preliminary regulatory intention of the agency 
be disclosed, but also the information which comes into its possession. An 
important function of notice is to apprise the public of the information the 
202. For a discussion of one staff's failure to attempt to develop a complete record and its 
inability to avoid becoming an advocate for the rule, see Yale Note 827-29. 
203. Notice is required by APA § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970). See Verkuil, supra note II2, 
at 235. Se~ also Verkuil, A Study oflnformalAdjudicationProcedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739, 
789-90 (1976); Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869,880-81 (1971) 
(suggesting that Federal Register notice as required by APA §3 (b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970), is 
ineffective to inform the public). 
204. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 91-92 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977) 
(requiring agencies "to set out their thinking in notices of proposed rulemaking" so that an 
agency discloses what it "thinks it knows in its capacity as a repository of expert opinion"); 
American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718,722 (D. C. Cir. 1974) ("The procedure chosen 
by the Commission must of course give the parties fair notice of exactly what the Commission 
proposes to do •... ");see also Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975); Wagner 
Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1972) (parties were denied right to 
participate on a particular issue because the notice failed to disclose that the proposed rule 
concerned the issue). But see Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 534 F.2d 981,983 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Even where there is a technical flaw in the notice, it can be overcome if the 
actual conduct of the proceeding provides notice to the participants of what is under contempla-
tion."); Texaco, Inc. v. FEA, 531 F.2d 1071, 1079-82 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1976), cert. 
denied, 96 S Ct. 2662 (1976) (too much specificity should not be required in rulemaking notice); 
Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1076 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct 2661 (1976) 
(notice was not insufficient because it did not say that the order might ~xtend to flowing gas). 
The notice and comment procedure might be enhanced by a requirement that, at least in 
major rulemaking efforts, the agency investigative staff publish with the notice a preliminary 
"statement of basis and purpose" based on the initial findings, theories and conclusions which 
went into the proposed rule. This requirement would not be as burdensome as it first would 
appear, because the staff will probably have drafted some form of document to present to the 
agency head or ultimate decision-maker in order to support issuance of a proposed rule. 
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agency has already accumulated and upon which it is basing its proposed 
rule. 205 Obviously, the notice cannot reiterate all the information supporting 
a proposed rule. But the information can be placed immediately on the 
public record, and the notice can explain how to obtain access to that record. 
In addition, any information acquired by the agency after issuance of the 
proposed rule should be promptly added to the public record. 
Again, the conceptual difference between the agency staff in rulemak-
ing and in adjudication becomes significant. In adjudication, the staff may 
be justified in acting as advocates and in controlling information which it 
intends to use. But in rulemaking it is responsible for developing a complete 
record, and disclosure of all the information which is needed to enable 
participants to question contrary information is essential to that task. 206 The 
staff cannot withhold information from the public record merely because it 
does not support the rule. In short, its job is not to "prove the rule" but to 
insure that the agency makes the right decision, even if that decision is 
contrary to the staff's preliminary position. 
The Environmental Protection Agency has increased the extent of its 
notice in response to judicial pressure. In Portland Cement Association v. 
Ruckelshaus,207 the District of Columbia Circuit found that the agency had 
failed to disclose in a timely fashion the test methodology and results used in 
promulgating a "standard of performance" for Portland cement plants 
under the Clean Air Act.208 As a result, the court ordered that the record be 
reopened so that the agency could receive written comments concerning this 
information. 209 In reaching the decision, the court expressed the important 
proposition that making information publicly available is a necessary ele-
ment of an efficient and fair rulemaking: ''It is not consonant with the 
purpose of. a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of 
inadequate data, or on data that, [to a] critical degree, is known only to the 
agency. " 210 The court favored disclosure of information as it was compiled 
in the on-going rulemaking process: 
In order that rule-making proceedings to determine standards be 
conducted in orderly fashion, information should generally be dis-
closed as to the basis of a proposed rule at the time of issuance. If this 
205. See Hamilton, supra note 73, at 63; Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75YALE 
L.J. 1227, 1244 (1966); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial 
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 379-81, 395 (1975). 
206. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977). The 
decision is carefully limited to assuring the disclosure of all information used by the agency and 
should not be read to impose on inforinal rulemaking the judicial concepts of ex parte communi-
cation and separation of function. 
207. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1974). 
208. 486 F.2d at 392. 
209. Id. at 393. 
210. Id. 
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is not feasible, as in case of statutory time constraints, information that 
is material to the subject at hand should be disclosed as it becomes 
available, and comments received, even though subsequent to issuance 
of the rule-with court authorization, where necessary. 211 
Largely because of this case, the EPA has established a procedure whereby 
the proposed methodology is made public well in advance of a rulemaking 
in order to encourage comment.212 
Since the right to participate effectively compels the establishment of a 
right of ready access to the information which the agency intends to use in 
reaching a regulatory decision, several courts have held that failure to 
disclose information important to effective participation will taint the entire 
procedure. 213 National Cable Television Association v. FCCZ14 involved the 
production of documents under the FOIA but the case is instructive on the 
issue of disclosure in rulemaking. The FCC had promulgated a new licens-
ing fee schedule which would make the agency self -supporting. The key 
issue involved the allocation of costs among industries. The court found that 
the agency had not made disclosure adequate to enable the interested parties 
to contest the rule: 
After setting forth this generalized explanation of its approach, 
however, the Commission failed to supply specifics, either as to the 
facts from which it had reasoned or as to the mechanical steps it had 
taken in deriving the final schedule. 
Without data concerning the Commission's costs, it is not possible 
to determine the basis upon which the Commission allocated its direct 
and indirect costs among the regulated industries. Without disclosure 
of the final amount the Commission intended to recover from each 
industry, it is not possible to determine what, if any, non cost adjust-
ments were made and whether the final schedule had any relation to the 
cost allocation. And without a definition and quantification of "value 
to the recipient" it is not possible to determine why and how the 
Commission might be deviating from a pure system of cost allocation. 
Thus, the Commission insulated itself from external criticism of its 
211. Id. at 394. See Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Water and Power 
Auth., 465 F.2d 1272, 1276 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973) ("Concomitant 
with [a meaningful hearing] are the essential requirements of adequate notice, dissemination to 
the public of the facts and figures on which the Authority relies, and opportunity afforded to 
those attending the hearing to rebut such facts and figures"); Hamilton, supra note 24, at 1333; 
Pedersen, supra note 24, at 75. 
212. See Williams, supra note 28, at 448-51. 
213. See, e.g., Roffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Kliendienst, 478 F.2d I, 19-25 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(failure to disclose an advisory committee report was "so egregious as to have tainted the entire 
procedure" because the interes.ted party may have made substantial use of the report). But 
insignificant nondisclosure, though inexcusable, is not reversible error. Mt. Mansfield Televi-
sion, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 489 (2d Cir. 1971). 
214. 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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method and rationale, leaving nothing open to challenge except the 
legality of its result. 2ts 
This "opaque notice," the court stated, led to the Association's request for 
documents under the FOIA. 216 The decision implied that notice, not access 
to documents, should have solved the problem of arming participants with 
the means for questioning a rule. The term "adequate notice" must be 
viewed as commanding the disclosure of all information necessary to permit 
effective private participation in the rulemaking. 217 
Finally, in Long Island Ry. v. United States218 the plaintiff railroads 
alleged, among other things, that the ICC should have disclosed 32,420 data 
sheets. Judge Friendly, writing for a three-judge court, suggested that the 
agency might have improved its procedure by serving on the carriers a 
detailed summary of the data relied on, but that the failure to do so was not 
fatal to the proceeding because the carriers had sufficient notice of the 
documents which might have formed the bases of the rule and could have 
obtained all the information with little effort on their part. 219 The court was 
obviously swayed by the absence of any showing that the lack of disclosure 
had hindered the carriers from making an effective argument against the 
Commission's proposal.220 Although this conclusion may reflect proper 
judicial restraint in review of harmless procedural defects, a rulemaking 
agency should endeavor to disclose everything available to it which may be 
used in considering a proposed rule. 221 The primary issue here is not merely 
215. Id. at 187. 
216. Id. As to the merits of the FOIA request, the court suggested that the scope of the 
request "was coextensive with the scope of the Commission's documentary basis for its rules." 
Id. at 195. The documents were ones which the agency should have been able to identify, since 
it relied on them, and the court therefore ordered disclosure except where one of the exemp-
tions in the FOIA applied. Id. at 194. 
217. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FI'C, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 
(1970) (FI'C was required to disclose the basis for the "reasons to believe" upon which it 
determined to issue a proposed rule); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659-60 (1st 
Cir. 1974) (court denied petitioners' claims that the EPA had given inadequate notice of the 
technical documents which would be relied upon, noting with approval that the EPA published 
notice that technical support documents were available). 
218. 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Florida E. 
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
219. Id. at 498-99. 
220. Id. at 499. Similarly, in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,660 (1st Cir. 1974), 
the First Circuit found that document disclosed after the hearing did not contain any informa-
tion petitioners needed. See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 681 (6th 
Cir. 1972) (failure to disclose certain materials in a more timely fashion was cured by the 
opportunity for comment after the materials were made available); accord, District of Colum-
bia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
221. One commentator has suggested that an agency should make timely voluntary disclo-
sure of all information to which a person could obtain access under the FOIA. See Pedersen, 
supra note 24, at 83. This does not go far enough, however. It is urged that agencies place in a 
readily accessible public record (and give notice of how to obtain access) to all information 
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the ability of an interested person to dispute the rule, but the extent to which 
openness will facilitate and stimulate effective comment.222 Thus, the notice 
of disclosure must also provide sufficient time to permit preparation of 
effective comment. 223 
CONCLUSION 
In rulemaking, as well as formal adjudication, adequate sources of 
information are essential to effective participation. Therefore, the develop-
ment of improved rulemaking procedures should include the incorporation 
of the various information gathering mechanisms traditionally available in 
adjudication. The investigative nature of rulemaking dictates that any im-
provement in the information gathering process will enhance the policy 
decision expressed in the rule. 
The nature of the rulemaking process may affect the application of 
traditional discovery devices. Prehearing conferences can solve many of the 
problems inherent in the movement to engraft some trial procedures onto the 
rulemaking process. Compulsory process may enhance the opportunity to 
participate by permitting the accumulation of information favorable to an 
interest and by fostering the confrontation of adverse information. But the 
broad scope of many rulemaking efforts compels substantial control of 
compulsory process with respect to private information. Little control, 
however, need be imposed on the opportunity to obtain documentary ~nfor­
mation in government files. Here the Freedom of Information Act becomes 
an essential tool to anyone participating in an informal agency proceeding. 
The traditional discovery device of written interrogatories meshes well with 
notice and comment rulemaking because it offers the opportunity for in-
terested persons to rebut or bolster information in written form and ,di-
minishes the need for the testimonial devices normally used at trial. Other 
traditional devices, such as depositions and admissions, do not appear 
generally appropriate to rulemaking but in rare situations may also enhance 
the information gathering process. And no discovery system is complete 
disclosable under the Act as well as other information which they are not required to disclose 
but which they may use in the rulemaking. See id. at 78-79. Pedersen's suggestion reflects far 
more concern for a useful record in review than for assuring effective participation. See id. at 
78-79. 
222. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965). "Publicity tends to stimulate the flow of 
information and public preferences which may significantly influence administrative and legis-
lative views as to the necessity and character of prospective action." Id at 294. See also S. Doc. 
No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1946). 
223. See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Frizzell, the 
court was skeptical, but upheld the rule despite the very short period between notice and the 
end of the comment period. Ordinarily, the court suggested, notice should be given at the time a 
decision that a new regulation is being considered becomes concrete. See Pedersen, supra note 
24, at 85. 
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without some devices in the nature of protective orders for maintaining the 
confidentiality of information. 
Complementary to a discovery system is a strict requirement of agency 
disclosure of the information on which its proposed rule has been based and 
which may be used to reach a final regulatory determination. The notion of 
adequate notice should be interpreted as requiring the agency to disclose and 
make readily accessible all the information it has relative to the rule. 
Complementing this full notice could be a requirement that the agency or its 
investigative staff publish with the proposed rule a preliminary "statement 
of basis and purpose." 
Discovery and disclosure thus become not only matters of fairness but 
means by which the agency can attract more information and purify that 
which it attracts. In sum, adequate access to information is an important 
element in fair and efficacious rulemaking. 
